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STUDENT ARTICLE
THE SURF IS UP, BUT WHO OWNS
THE BEACH?-WHO SHOULD REGULATE
COMMERCE ON THE INTERNET?
CHARLES R. TOPPING*
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 21, 1998, President Clinton signed into law the
Internet Tax Freedom Act as part of the Fiscal Year 1999 Omni-
bus Appropriations Bill. The act imposes a three-year morato-
rium on all taxation of Internet access fees charged by Internet
service providers ("ISPs") and on "multiple" or "discriminatory"
taxes on electronic commerce. The act creates a 19-member
Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce which will strive
to develop a national framework within eighteen months to col-
lect and distribute state tax receipts in a fairly nondiscriminatory
way. This commission must include the secretaries of the Treas-
ury and Commerce Departments, the U.S. trade representative,
eight leaders from industry and consumer groups, and eight
from state and local governments. The act also includes a grand-
father provision for existing state and local taxes on Internet
access under certain conditions.
The process that led to the act's passage began on June 23,
1998, when the U.S. House of Representatives unanimously
passed its version of the Internet Tax Freedom Act.' That act
cited among its goals the establishment of a "national policy"
against state and local interference with interstate commerce on
the Internet and the exercise of congressional jurisdiction over
interstate commerce by "establishing a moratorium on the impo-
sition of exactions that would interfere with the free flow of com-
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merce via the Internet."2 The act also included a declaration
that the Internet should be free of foreign tariffs, trade barriers,
and other restrictions.3
On October 8, 1998, the Senate followed suit and passed,
almost unanimously, a separate but similar piece of legislation,
also entitled the Internet Tax Freedom Act.4 Like its House
counterpart, this legislation would also place a moratorium of
three years on any new Internet and electronic commerce taxes.
It was this version with some slight modifications that made its
way into the Omnibus Appropriations Bill signed by President
Clinton. The version of the act, as reported and amended by the
Senate Committee on Finance as of October 1, contained several
legislative findings. These findings may illuminate the regulatory
mindset on Capitol Hill concerning the Internet:
(1) As a massive global network spanning not only State
but international borders, the Internet and the related
provision of online services and Internet access service
are inherently a matter of interstate and foreign com-
merce within thejurisdiction of the United States Con-
gress under Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United
States Constitution.
(2) Even within the United States, the Internet does not
respect State lines and operates independently of State
boundaries. Addresses on the Internet are designed
to be geographically indifferent. Internet transmis-
sions are insensitive to physical distance and can have
multiple geographical addresses.
(3) ... [I]t is... infeasible to separate domestic intrastate
Internet transmissions from interstate and foreign
Internet transmissions.
(4) Consumers, businesses, and others engaging in inter-
state and foreign commerce through online services
and Internet access service could become subject to
more than 30,000 separate taxing jurisdictions in the
United States alone.
(5) Inconsistent and inadministerable taxes imposed on
online services and Internet access service by State and
local governments threaten to
(A) subject consumers, businesses, and other users
engaged in interstate and foreign commerce to
multiple, confusing, and burdensome taxation,
2. Id.
3. See id. § 6.
4. See S. 442, 105th Cong. (1998).
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(B) restrict the growth and continued technological
maturation of the Internet itself, and
(C) call into question the continued viability of this
dynamic medium.
(6) Because the tax laws and regulations of so many juris-
dictions were established long before the advent of the
Internet, online services, and Internet access service,
their application to this new medium and services in
unintended and unpredictable ways could prove to be
an unacceptable burden on the interstate and foreign
commerce of the Nation.
(7) The electronic marketplace of services, products, and
ideas available through the Internet can be especially
beneficial to senior citizens, the physically challenged,
citizens in rural areas, and small businesses. It also
offers a variety of uses and benefits for educational
institutions and charitable organizations.
(8) A consistent and coherent national policy regarding
taxation of online services, Internet access service, and
communications and transactions using the Internet,
and the concomitant uniformity, simplicity, and fair-
ness that is needed to avoid burdening this evolving
form of interstate and foreign commerce, can best be
achieved by the United States exercising its authority
under Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States
Constitution.
5
It is clear both from these findings as well as from the lan-
guage of the Act that the 105th Congress placed a premium on
the unfettered growth and development of the Internet as an
instrumentality or conduit of interstate commerce. The Con-
gress believed that state and local taxation could create an "unac-
ceptable burden" on interstate commerce conducted via the
Internet. It passed the Internet Tax Freedom Act to prevent the
imposition of that burden. Senator Wyden, one of the sponsors
of the Senate version of the act, aptly summarized these senti-
ments when he expressed his concern that if local and state regu-
lators were to create "a crazy quilt of State and local taxes where
each jurisdiction goes off and does its own thing, it is going to be
very difficult for those entrepreneurs, senior citizens, handi-
5. S. 442, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998), reported in 144 CONG. REc. S11269-01
(1998).
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capped and disabled people to go out and hire the accountants
and lawyers that would be necessary ... . 6 He continued:
If somebody from Florida, for example, orders Harry and
David's fruit in Medford, [Oregon,] using America Online
in Virginia, pays for it with a bank card in California, and
ships it to their cousin in New York, we are talking about a
completely different kind of commerce than we have seen
in the past.
7
Concerns about uniformity and promotion of Internet-based
commerce, however, are not the only concerns. They seem to
clash with concerns about state and local interests in raising reve-
nue and overall fairness in tax policy. The National League of
Cities, holding its annual convention in Kansas City during the
first week of December, spoke against provisions in the Internet
Tax Freedom Act, decrying the legislation for its potential to
deprive local governments of a vital source of revenue.' Senator
Graham of Florida voiced these same concerns when he said that
"the price that society is going to pay is imbalance in the com-
mercial marketplace and a degradation of our police, fire and
educational services."9 Senator Enzi suggested that the act would
discriminate against local businesses whose Internet-based com-
petitors would not have to pay sales and use taxes. He argued,
"Are we going to be in the business of picking the tax winners
and the tax losers? I am talking about the towns where the peo-
ple of America live. We know who the losers will be. It will be
the small retailer in your town, the one that you rely on to run
down and pick up the emergency item."10
These opposing concerns implicate the tension between fed-
eral interests and state and local interests. This tension, often
characteristic of congressional preemption under the Commerce
Clause, has now reached the Internet. The Internet Tax Free-
dom Act is not the only attempt by Congress to regulate the
Internet. Congress also passed the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act of 1998,11 which was amended to the Internet Tax
6. 144 CONG. REC. S11682-01 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Wyden).
7. Id.
8. See League of Cities to Fight Tax Exemption for Web Sales, BuFFALo NEWS,
Dec. 8, 1998, at E8.
9. 144 CONG. REc. S11682-01 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Graham).
10. 144 CONG. REc. Sl1651-02 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Enzi).
11. 144 CONG. REc. S11847-02, S11861-11863 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998), 144
CONG. REc. H11044-03, H11240-HI1242 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1998).
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Freedom Act and which mandates that the Federal Trade Com-
mission write rules and enforcement strategies requiring
researchers to obtain parental permission before collecting per-
sonal information over the Internet from minors, including their
name, address, e-mail address, and phone number. Congress
also passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,12 which imple-
ments treaties on intellectual property protection that the Clin-
ton Administration negotiated, and which protects America's
intellectual property in the online environment. Additionally,
Congress enacted the Government Paperwork Elimination Act,13
which encourages the government to move towards electronic fil-
ing and the acceptance of electronic signatures. Finally, Con-
gress passed the Next Generation Internet Research Act of
1998,4 which authorizes an initiative to connect universities at
speeds that are 1,000 times faster than today's Internet and con-
duct long-term research on Internet technologies.
This flurry of recent legislation affecting the Internet should
come as no surprise. Since the early nineties, the Internet has
captured the fancy of legal scholars, practitioners, and legislators
alike. " The panoply of recent literature about the Internet
underscores its perceived importance.16 Litigation that involves
12. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
13. Title XVII of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
14. Pub. L. No. 105-305, 112 Stat. 2919 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C.
§§ 5501-03, 5511, 5513).
15. Articles about the legal challenges of a widely used Internet have
been appearing in law journals since 1993.
16. Discussion about the legal, ethical, and public policy ramifications of
the Internet has reached an all-time high. The vast number of recent articles
addressing law and the Internet in some manner no doubt illustrates the
perceived importance and perhaps also the complexity that this new
technological conundrum presents. In 1997 alone, there were at least 73
articles published in various law journals attempting to make legal sense of this
new medium. Twenty of them dealt with issues involving jurisdiction and the
Internet. Eight dealt with obscenity and the Internet. Seven dealt with
copyright protection and the Internet. Six dealt with issues involving
government regulation of Internet-based activities. Five dealt with privacy and
the Internet. Four concerned themselves with trademark protection on the
Internet. Four dealt with issues involving taxation of Internet-based activities.
Four dealt with issues of free speech and the Internet. Yet four more of them
dealt with issues involving currency regulation and the Internet. Three
addressed the proper legal regime that should govern the Internet. Three.were
concerned with intellectual property and the Internet generally. Three
addressed defamation and libel on the Internet. Two dealt with
telecommunications and the Internet.
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Internet-related issues has become more commonplace. 17 Regu-
lators at both the federal and state level have introduced more
legislative initiatives concerning the Internet than ever before.
Far from leveling off, this flurry of activity seems to be
intensifying.
A brief glimpse at some of the substantive legal issues raised
by the Internet illustrates the pervasiveness of this new techno-
logical medium. The Internet has rekindled as vigorously the
fervor of free speech activists" as it has the resolve of those who
rally against pornography. 9 It has given rise to a flurry of intel-
17. In 1997, for example, at least seven state cases and 45 federal cases
dealt in some way with liability for Internet-based activity.
18. For discussions about free speech, the First Amendment, and the
Internet, see generally David J. Goldstone, The Public Forum Doctrine in the Age of
the Information Superhighway (Where are the Public Forums on the Information
Superhighway?), 46 HASTINGS L.J. 335 (1995); Charles Nesson & David Marglin,
The Day the Internet Met the First Amendment: Time and the Communications Decency
Act, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 113 (1996); Norman Redlich & David R. Lurie, First
Amendment Issues Presented by the "Information Superhighway," 25 SETON HALL L.
REv. 1446 (1995); Bruce W. Sanford & MichaelJ. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog
New Tricks: The First Amendment in an Online World, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1137
(1996); Jeffrey E. Faucette, Note, The Freedom of Speech at Risk in Cyberspace:
Obscenity Doctrine and a Frightened University's Censorship of Sex on the Internet, 44
DUKE L.J. 1155 (1995); Glen Kubota, Comment, Public School Usage of Internet
Filtering Software: Book Banning Reincarnated?, 17 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 687 (1997);
Fia F. Porter, Note, Defamatory Speech on the Internet: "Dish" Best Served Chilled?, 41
N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rv. 731 (1997); StaceyJ. Rappaport, Note, Rules of the Road: The
Constitutional Limits of Restricting Indecent Speech on the Information Superhighway, 6
FORDHAM IrTEI . PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301 (1995); Jill M. Ryan, Note,
Freedom to Speak Unintelligibly: The First Amendment Implications of Government-
Controlled Encryption, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1165 (1996).
19. For discussions about obscenity and the Internet, see generally Blake
T. Bilstad, Obscenity and Indecency in a Digital Age: The Legal and Political
Implications of Cybersmut, Virtual Pornography, and the Communications Decency Act of
1996, 13 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 321 (1997); Debora D. Burke, The
Criminalization of Virtual Child Pornography: A Constitutional Question, 34 HARv. J.
ON LEGIs. 439 (1997); Debora D. Burke, Cybersmut and the First Amendment: A Call
for a New Obscenity Standard, 9 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 87 (1996); Robert Cannon,
The Legislative History of Senator Exon's Communications Decency Act: Regulating
Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51 (1996); Allen S.
Hammond, IV, Indecent Proposals: Reason, Restraint and Responsibility in the
Regulation of Indecency, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. F. 259 (1996); Fred Lawrence,
Pornography: Free Speech or Censorship in Cyberspace?, 3 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 3
(1997); Vikas Arora, Note, The Communications Decency Act: Congressional
Repudiation of the "Right Stuff," 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 473 (1997); Timothy S. T.
Bass, Comment, Obscenity in Cyberspace: Some Reasons for Retaining the Local
Community Standard, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 471 (1996); Joseph N. Campolo,
Note, Childporn. GIF: Establishing Liability for On-Line Service Providers, 6 FoRDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 721 (1996); Dennis W. Chiu, Comment,
Obscenity on the Internet: Local Community Standards for Obscenity are Unworkable on
the Information Superhighway, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 185 (1995); Patrick T.
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lectual property litigation surrounding the use of domain names
and cyber-squatting.2 ° A widespread number of employers now
Egan, Note, Virtual Community Standards: Should Obscenity Law Recognize the
Contemporary Community Standard of Cyberspace?, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. Rrv. 117
(1996); Sean J. Petrie, Note, Indecent Proposals: How Each Branch of the Federal
Government Overstepped Its Institutional Authority in the Development of Internet
Obscenity Law, 49 STAN. L. REv. 637 (1997); Robyn Forman Pollack, Comment,
Creating the Standards of a Global Community: Regulating Pornography on the
Internet-An International Concern, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 467 (1996); Sean
Adam Shiff, Comment, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Criminal Liability for
Obscene and Indecent Speech on the Internet, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 731 (1996);
Ari Staiman, Note, Shielding Internet Users from Undesirable Content: The Advantages
of a Pics Based Rating System, 20 FoRDHAN1 INT'L L.J. (1997); Donald T. Stepka,
Note, Obscenity On-Line: A Transactional Approach to Computer Transfers of
Potentially Obscene Material, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 905 (1997).
20. Domain names, such as "cnn.com" or "microsoft.com," are the names
that users type in to reach a given site. Internic is the sole company that issues
domain names. Internic's Web site is located at <http://rs.intemic.net/
internic.html>. Cyber-squatting refers to the situation that occurs when
companies seeking to establish their own Internet sites find that someone else,
a domain "squatter" has already registered their trademarks with Internic. This
squatter then holds the trademarks for ransom. See Stacy B. Sterling, New Age
Bandits in Cyberspace: Domain Names Held Hostage on the Internet, 17 Loy. L.A. ENT.
L.J. 733 (1997). For discussions about domain names and trademark
protection on the Internet, see generally G. Andrew Barger, Cybermarks: A
Proposed Hierarchical Modeling System of Registration and Internet Architecture for
Domain Names, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 623 (1996); Jessica R. Friedman, A
Lawyer's Ramble Down the Information Superhighway: Trademark, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 730 (1995); Neal J. Freidman & Kevin Siebert, The Name is Not Always the
Same, 20 PUGET SOUND L. REv. 631 (1997); Carl Oppedahl, Half a Century of
Federal Trademark Protection: The Lanham Act Turns Fifty: Analysis and Suggestions
Regarding NSI Domain Name Trademark Dispute Policy, 7 FoPDHAM INrELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 73 (1996); Gayle Weiswasser, Domain Names, the Internet, and
Trademarks: Infringement in Cyberspace, 13 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 137
(1997); Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Note, Trademark Law Lost in Cyberspace:
Trademark Protection for Internet Addresses, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483 (1996); Carrie
Weinfeld, Comment, Internet Domain Names and Trademark Infringement, 23 OHIO
N.U. L. REv. 229 (1996). For discussions about copyright infringement and the
Internet, see generallyJulie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look
at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 981 (1996); Niva Elkin-
Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in
Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENr. L.J. 215 (1996); Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting
Cars on the "Information Superhighway" Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in
Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1466 (1995); Rex S. Heinke & Lincoln D.
Bandlow, Copyright Protection on the Internet, 1010 PLI/CoRP. 557 (1997); Michael
A. Jaccard, Securing Copyright in Transnational Cyberspace: The Case for Contracting
With Potential Infringers, 35 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 619 (1997); AndyJohnson-
Laird, Copyright Owners' Rights and Users' Privileges on the Internet: The Anatomy of
the Internet Meets the Body of the Law, 22 DAYTON L. REv. 465 (1997); Leslie A.
Kurtz, Copyright and the Internet-World Without Borders, 43 WAYNE L. R.Ex. 117
(1996); Peggy A. Miller, Copyright Protection on the Internet: Hyperlinks and Web Site
Material Fair Use Doctrine and the Internet, 1010 PLI/CoRP. 505 (1997); Pamela
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grapple with issues like e-mail privacy in the workplace. 21
Internet activities have also precipitated numerous defamation
SuitS. 2 2 Attorneys who advertise on the Internet could face liabil-
ity in other jurisdictions.23 The Internet has also proven to be
Samuelson, Copyright in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Copyright Office be Obsolete
in the Twenty-First Century?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 55 (1994); Ronald
Urbach, Protection and Use of Copyrightable Material in the New Media Age, 1010
PLI/CoRP. 449 (1997); Barbara Cohen, Note, A Proposed Regime for Copyright
Protection on the Internet, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 401 (1996); Benjamin R. Kuhn,
Comment, A Dilemma in Cyberspace and Beyond: Copyright Law for Intellectual
Property Distributed Over the Information Superhighways of Today and Tomorrow, 10
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 171 (1996); Joanne Benoit Nakos, Comment, An
Analysis of the Effect of New Technology on the Rights Conveyed by Copyright License
Agreements, 25 CUMB. L. REv. 433 (1995). For discussions about intellectual
property and the Internet generally, see James H. Aiken, The Jurisdiction of
Trademark and Copyright Infringement on the Internet, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1331
(1997); Ronald Cass, Symposium: Protecting Software and Information on the Internet,
3 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 2 (1997); Charles R. McManis, Taking Trips on the
Information Superhighway: International Intellectual Property Protection and Emerging
Computer Technology, 41 VILL. L. REv. 207 (1996); Robert P. Merges, Contracting
into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84
CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Steven A. Meyerowitz, Intellectual Property: Where the
Boom Is, PA. LAw., Oct. 19, 1997, at 35; Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Property and
Innovation in the Global Information Infrastructure, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261
(1996); Michael P. Schallop, Protecting User Interfaces: Not as Easy as 1-2-3, 45
EMORY L.J. 1533 (1996).
21. For discussions about the privacy issues associated with the Internet,
see generally Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Legitimate Business Interest: No End in Sight? An
Inquiry into the Status of Privacy in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 77 (1996);
Anne L. Lehman, E-Mail in the Workplace: Question of Privacy, Property or Principle?,
5 COMm. L. CONSPECTUS 99 (1997); Theresa E. Loscalzo, Control vs. Privacy: Why
You May Need a Formal E-Mail Policy, PA. LAw., Oct. 19, 1997, at 30; Michael
Skatoff-Gee, Comment, Changing Technologies and the Expectation of Privacy: A
Modern Dilemma, 28 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 189 (1996).
22. For discussions about defamation or libel and the Internet, see
generally Cynthia L. Counts & C. Amanda Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A
Framework for Addressing Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in this New Frontier, 59
ALB. L. REv. 1083 (1996); Keith Silver, Good Samaritans in Cyberspace, 23 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1997); Jeffrey M. Taylor, Liability of USENET
Moderators for Defamation Published by Others: Flinging the Law of Defamation into
Cyberspace, 47 FLA. L. REv. 247 (1995); Richard P. Hermann, II, Note and
Comment, Who is Liable for Online Libel, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 423 (1996);
Douglas B. Luftman, Note, Defamation Liability for On-Line Services: The Sky is Not
Falling, 65 Geo. WASH. L. REv. 1071 (1997); Finley P. Maxson, Note, A Pothole on
the Information Superhighway: BBS Operator Liability for Defamatory Statements, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 673 (1997);Jeremy Stone Weber, Note, Defining Cyberlibel: A First
Amendment Limit for Libel Suits Against Individuals Arising from Computer Bulletin
Board Speech, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 235 (1995).
23. For example, Texas and Florida have concluded that law firm Web
pages (apparently including those of out-of-state firms) are subject to the rules
of professional conduct applicable to attorney advertising. See American
Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Texans
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elusive ground for fraud, where e-mail addresses can be hijacked
and messages can be intercepted or copied. Anonymity can be
generated by Internet users quite readily, given that a user's com-
puter address may be altered and a user's name may be changed
or masked.24 Untraceable hackers have the ability to cripple
entire servers by sending an overwhelming barrage of "spare." 25
Even if the liabilities are clear-cut, and the defendants are
known, discerning who has proper jurisdiction over acts commit-
ted on the Internet often poses further obstacles.26 Corporate
Against Censorship v. State Bar of Texas, 888 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Tex. 1995)
(discussing applicability of Texas lawyers' advertising regulations to the
Internet). Minnesota has aggressively pursued out-of-state advertisers and
service providers who reach Minnesotans via the Internet.
24. For more information on the problems posed by anonymity on the
Internet, see Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer Transactions in
Electronic Commerce: Why Self-Regulation is Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REv. 847 (1998);
George P. Long, III, Who are You?: Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55 U.
PrrT. L. REv. 1177 (1994); PeterJ. Toren, Internet: A Safe Haven for Anonymous
Information Thieves?, 11 ST.JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 647 (1996); Noah Levin,
Note, Establishing Legal Accountability for Anonymous Communication in Cyberspace,
96 COLUM. L. REv. 1526 (1996).
25. "Spamming" is the practice of bombarding computer users'
mailboxes with unsolicited posts, usually advertisements. For more information
about spamming, see Wendy R. Leibowitz, The Age of E-Mail Hits the FTC: Lawyers
Fight Spam Via E-Mail, NAT'L L.J., May 12, 1997, at B6; Richard Raysman & Peter
Brown, Junk E-Mail and On-Line Services: Unspreadable "Spain," NEW YORK L.J.,
Mar. 11, 1997, at 3 (col.1).
26. For discussions of issues involving jurisdiction over Internet-based
activities, see generally Dan L. Burk, Jurisdiction in a World Without Borders, 1 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 3 (1997) <http:/www.student.virginia.edu/-jolt/graphics/voll/
homeart3.html>; Alexander Gigante, Ice Patch on the Information Superhighway:
Foreign Liability for Domestically Created Content, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 523
(1996); David R. Johnson & David Post, Surveying Law and Borders: Law and
Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367 (1996); Lawrence
Lessig, Symposium: Surveying Law and Borders: The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1403 (1996); Karin Mika & Aaron J. Reber, Internet Jurisdictional Issues:
Fundamental Fairness in a Virtual World, 30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1169 (1997);
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Henry
H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The Role of Intermediaries (Jan. 28-29,
1996) <http://www.law.vill.edu/harvard/article/harv96k.htm>; Timothy S. Wu,
Cyberspace Sovereignty ?-The Internet and the International System, 10 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 647 (1997);Joanna Zakalik, Law Without Borders in Cyberspace, 43 WAYNE L.
REv. 101 (1996); Richard S. Zembek, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental
Fairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 339 (1996);
Richard H. Acker, Comment, Choice-of-Law Questions in Cyberfraud, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 437 (1996); Cory B. Ackerman, Note, World-Wide Volkswagen, Meet the
World Wide Web: An Examination of Personal Jurisdiction Applied to a New World, 71
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 403 (1997);Jason L. Brodsky, Comment, Recent Decision: Civil
Procedure-Surfin' the Stream of Commerce: Compuserve v. Patterson, 89F3d 1257
(6th Cir. 1996), 70 TEMP. L. REv. 825 (1997); Matthew R. Burnstein, Note,
Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J.
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executives transacting business on the Internet have grown
increasingly wary of being ensnared by some obscure law that the
courts of a remote state seek to enforce in cyberspace,2 7 even
though the law was written long before the Internet ever
existed.28 Despite the newly-formed Advisory Commission on
Electronic Commerce, regulators at the federal, state, and local
levels will no doubt continue to debate the merits of different
types of taxation schemes, and lobby the Commission to embrace
their positions.2"
TRANSNAT'L L. 75 (1996); Tara Blake Garfinkel, Comment, Jurisdiction Over
Communication Torts: Can You Be Pulled into Another Country's Court System for
Making a Defamatory Statement Over the Internet? A Comparison of English and U.S.
Law, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 489 (1996); Sonia K. Gupta, Comment, Bulletin Board
Systems and Personal Jurisdiction: What Comports with Fair Play and Substantial
Justice?, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519 (1996); Gwenn M. Kalow, Note, From the
Internet to Court: Exercising Jurisdiction Over World Wide Web Communications, 65
FoRDHAM L. REv. 2241 (1997); Bryce A. Lenox, Note, Personal Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace: Teaching the Stream of Commerce Dog New Internet Tricks: Compuserve,
Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996), 22 DAYrON L. REV. 331 (1997);
Christopher W. Meyer, Note, World Wide Web Advertising: Personal Jurisdiction
Around the Whole Wide World?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1269 (1997); Leif
Swedlow, Note, Three Paradigms of Presence: A Solution for Personal Jurisdiction on
the Internet, 22 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 337 (1997); David Thatch, Note, Personal
Jurisdiction and the World-Wide Web: Bits (and Bytes) of Minimum Contacts, 23
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 143 (1997).
27. The term "cyberspace" was created by science fiction author William
Gibson in his short stories and novels, to describe an alternate reality that
characters entered by connecting their minds to a computer network. See
WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 55 (1984); see also William Gibson, Burning
Chrome, OMNI, July 1982, at 72, reprinted in WILLIAM GIBSON, BURNING CHROME
168 (1986).
28. As Judge Preska observed in American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, "The
unique nature of the Internet highlights the likelihood that a single actor might
be subject to haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent
regulation by states that the actor never intended to reach and possibly was
unaware were being accessed." 969 F. Supp. 160, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
29. For discussions of issues involving taxation of Internet-based activities,
see generally Saba Ashraf, Virtual Taxation: State Taxation of Internet and On-Line
Sales, 24 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 605 (1997); R. Scot Gierson, State Taxation of the
Information Superhighway: A Proposal for Taxation of Information Services, 16 Loy.
L.A. ENr. L.J. 603 (1996); Gregory A. Ichel, Internet Sounds Death Knellfor Use
Taxes: States Continue to Scream over Lost Revenues, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 643
(1997); Edward A. Morse, State Taxation of Internet Commerce: Something New
Under the Sun?, 30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1113 (1997). See also Selected Tax Policy
Implications of Global Electronic Commerce (November 1996), published by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury Office of Tax Policy, which has been posted to the
Treasury Department's home page on the World Wide Web at <http://www.
ustreas.gov>. See also Richard G. Cohen & Paul Terry, Online Taxation Issues
Undergo Federal Scrutiny: Treasury Department Suggests Following Principle of
Neutrality to Develop Online Tax Policies, NAT'L L.J., May 5, 1997, at B16.
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The flurry of recent activity to come to terms with the
Internet is inextricably tied to the question of what the Internet
actually is. Because the Internet is so diverse, it functions like no
other single means of communication already in existence.
Applying existing legal and regulatory paradigms to the Internet
seems to be unavailing. Is the Internet more like television, print
media, telephone, or a highway? ° While surfing the Internet,
"one rapidly encounters actors that resemble publishers, phone
companies, postal services, libraries, bookstores, flea markets,
retailers, soapbox preachers, and voyeurs."3 1 H. Joseph Hame-
line and William Miles, in a piece appearing in the Boston Bar
Journal, describe why sometimes applying existing legal and regu-
latory paradigms to the Internet can be like trying to fit a square
peg into a round hole:
Unlike a postal service, online there is often no identifiable
sender and rarely does the creator of the information
direct it to a particular recipient. As distinguished from
the traditional publisher, the Internet publisher does not
maintain editorial control over the content of messages
and cannot control their distribution. Regarding the
broadcast medium, receiving images and messages over
the Internet requires active selection and decision making
not part of the passive viewing of television or radio....
Commercial endeavors in this "sprawling mall offering
goods and services" range from passive advertising to inter-
active communication and sales.3 2
Moreover, as the Senate findings in the Internet Tax Free-
dom Act suggest, the Internet defies our traditional methods of
delineating boundaries. When traversing cyberspace, we receive
little or no warning as to when we have left our state, our nation,
or our continent.33 Indeed, the Internet is truly a transnational
communications medium with no discernible borders. As Sean
Selin writes, "[s]ince international boundaries do not appear as
signposts on the information superhighway, activities on the
Internet can take place in distant jurisdictions, sometimes with-
out the knowledge of the actor." 4 The new relationships that
the Internet creates among and between individuals "strain legal
30. See H. Joseph Hameline & William Miles, The Dormant Commerce Clause
Meets the Internet, B. B.J., Oct. 1997, at 8.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 28 (quoting American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 1).
33. See id.
34. Sean Selin, Note, Governing Cyberspace: The Need for an International
Solution, 32 GONZ. L. REv. 365, 370 (1996). Additionally, consider the
following:
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principles and categories that currently direct judicial power over
individual action, either civilly or criminally."35 This has led sev-
eral commentators to argue that cyberspace requires a regime of
rules quite distinct from those that currently regulate physical,
geographically defined territories.3 6 Others have observed that
the current structure of the Internet increases the pressure on
courts and regulators to impose liability on intermediaries such
as Web servers and Internet-access providers. Henry Perritt illus-
trates the rationale behind this approach when he writes:
Whose substantive legal rules apply to a defamatory
message that is written by someone in Mexico, read by
So insensitive is the [Internet] network to geography, that it is
frequently impossible to determine the physical location of a resource
or user. Such information is unimportant to the network's function or
to the purposes of its creators, and the network's design thus makes
little provision for geographic discernment. In real space, a business
can usually locate the person or entity with whom it is interacting; this
tends to facilitate identification of partners and validation of
transactions. This process is far more difficult in cyberspace, when the
parties in a transaction may be in adjoining rooms or half the world
away, and the network offers no way to tell the difference.
Burk, supra note 26, 14 (1997). Also consider the following:
Because current technology does not permit construction of imperme-
able walls to control the flow of Internet communication from country
to country (walls being inimical to the concept of the Internet in any
event), legal action-whether civil, criminal, or regulatory-affecting
the Internet in any country will have Internet-wide, and consequently
international implications.
Gigante, supra note 26, at 524.
35. William S. Byassee., Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World
Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FORsT L. REv. 197, 199 (1995).
Consider the following:
Cyberspace has undermined the feasibility of applying the traditional
minimum contacts requirement to activities taking place on the
Internet. The Internet is global. Geographic borders on the Internet
are completely intangible. There are no border guards or custom
officials in cyberspace to punctuate the travel of electrons from a
computer in India to a computer in the United States. That has
caused many observers to conclude that geographic borders are
irrelevant on the Internet.
Zakalik, supra note 26, at 106. See generally Zembek, supra note 26, and specifi-
cally, id. at 341-42.
36. David Johnson and David Post write:
Separated from doctrine tied to territorial jurisdictions, new rules will
emerge to govern a wide range of new phenomena [found in the
Internet] that have no clear parallel in the nonvirtual world. These
new rules will play the role of law by defining legal personhood and
property, resolving disputes, and crystalizing a collective conversation
about online participants' core values.
Johnson & Post, supra note 26.
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someone in Israel by means of an Internet server located in
the United States, injuring the reputation of a Norwegian?
Whose courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of
injury or violation of national standards? Must a Norwe-
gian go to Mexico or the United States to find a legal insti-
tution with power over one of the two potential sources of
compensation? If not, if jurisdiction exists in Norway, the
most convenient forum for the victim, how is a favorable
decision by a Norwegian tribunal ordering that the Mexi-
can originator or the American intermediary pay damages
to be enforced?
Suppose the message is criminal instead of defamatory,
involving child pornography or indecency, or representing
some sort of financial fraud or forgery or terroristic threat.
Where can the wrongdoer be tried, only where he is physi-
cally found? If the answer is yes, how should extradition or
extra-legal means of physically moving the alleged wrong-
doer to the place of trial be utilized? Whose substantive
criminal law should apply? An inability to answer these
questions satisfactorily increases the pressure to hold
intermediaries liable, because unsatisfactory answers to the
jurisdictional questions make legal recovery from content
originators less likely. The Internet tradition of allowing
anonymity makes the position of intermediaries even
worse. If the victim cannot identify the originator because
she is anonymous, immunizing an intermediary leaves a
faultless victim bearing the loss.
3 7
Yet others argue that no changes are needed, that existing
legal and regulatory paradigms are sufficient for application to
Internet-based activities. 8 Recently, in exercising jurisdiction,
courts have attempted to draw a distinction between "passive"
37. Perritt, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The Role of Intermediaries, supra note
26.
38. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and The Law of the Horse,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 203; Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding
Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475 (1998).
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Web sites and more interactive sites.39 The factors a court should
use to distinguish between the two are less clear.4 °
What is clear, however, is that legal scholars, practitioners,
and legislators wield quite a number of different-and often con-
flicting-solutions to the perplexities of the Internet. We are
befuddled not only by the inherent conceptual difficulties that
the Internet poses, but also by the plethora of solutions pro-
posed. Which solution-or group of solutions-is the right solu-
tion? This tough question cannot be ignored. Despite its
challenges, the Internet is here to stay. Its full potential has yet
to be realized. Its effect on our economy, our culture, and our
society continues to expand.
The numbers speak for themselves. The Internet has exper-
ienced extraordinary growth. In 1981, fewer than 300 computers
were linked to the Internet, and by 1989, the number grew to
approximately 90,000.41 By 1993, over one million computers
were linked.42 By the beginning of 1995, the Internet linked 75
countries, with another 77 connected by e-mail.4 By late 1996,
the total number of Internet host computers worldwide was esti-
39. See Getting Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Is No Snap (or Click), NAT'L L.J., Dec.
29, 1997, at B12. The story reads, in pertinent part:
Three federal circuit courts have now addressed whether and when a
Web site confers jurisdiction in a state foreign to the Web master. The
Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals found a purely passive Web site
insufficient for personal jurisdiction to be asserted over a Missouri
defendant under New York's long-arm statute. Bensusan Restaurant
Corp. v. King, [106 F.3d 25 (2nd Cir. 1997)].... Confronted with a
slightly more interactive Web site, where a visitor to the home page
who wanted to learn more was allowed to leave a name and contact
information, the Ninth Circuit declined to exercise jurisdiction over
the Florida defendant when no other contacts with the state, Arizona,
were found, and there was no evidence that anyone from Arizona had
left a name or even accessed the site. Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell Inc.,
[130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997)].
... Those seeking [to have a court exercise] jurisdiction based on
online activity should turn to CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d
1257 (6th Cir. 1996), in which the court found that the Texas-based
defendant had targeted and solicited business in the plaintiff's state.
40. For a listing of factors to which courts have looked in determining
jurisdiction over Web site owners, see Otho B. Ross, Recent Case Finds Web Site
Confers Jurisdiction: A Minnesota Court Holds That a Gambling Web Site Subjects Its
Owner to Personal Jurisdiction, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 3, 1997, at Cl. For an analysis of
recent cases addressing personal jurisdiction for Internet-based activities, see
Dale M. Cendali & Rebecca L. Weinstein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet,
520 PLI/PAT. 975 (1998).
41. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (threejudge
court) (finding 3). For a brief synopsis of this case, see infra note 58.
42. See id.
43. See Gigante, supra note 26, at 523.
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mated to be 9.4 million, with 60% of those located within the
United States." Estimates placed the total number of Internet
users worldwide at forty million people.4 5 These numbers are
increasing exponentially, causing estimates of future growth to
be revised upward.4 6 As of February 1997, the Internet consisted
of thirteen million host computers in 90 countries linked by
more than 50,000 connected computer networks.4 7
Commercial activity on the Internet has also witnessed
explosive growth. Internet advertising revenues exceeded $1 bil-
lion in 1997, up from $267 million in 1996.48 Within a single
year, Amazon.com, an online bookstore, increased its sales nearly
ten times, selling 6.5 million books in 1997. Also in a year's time,
Internet airline ticket sales nearly tripled and are expected to
grow sixfold, to $5 billion a year, by the year 2000.4 1
Earlier in 1998, the United States Department of Commerce
issued a report titled The Emerging Digital Economy, which contains
a number of interesting statistics on the growth of electronic
commerce. The high-tech industry employs 7.4 million people,
earning an average of $46,000 annually, compared to $28,000 in
the private sector overall, and suffers from a shortage of skilled
workers. Traffic on the Internet is doubling every 100 days, mak-
ing it the fastest growing technology in human history. By the
end of 1997, ten million people had purchased something online
with a credit card, double the 1996 rate.50
We can expect the Internet's extraordinary growth to con-
tinue. The total number of Internet users is expected to grow to
200 million by next year.5 According to a recent report by For-
rester Research,5 2 business-to-business electronic commerce will
44. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831. The court went on to state,
"This count does not include the personal computers people use to access the
Internet using modems." Id.
45. See id.
46. A 1996 estimate suggested that the Internet takes on approximately
one million new users each month. See Parry Aftab, Monitoring Communications
on the Internet: Big Brother or Responsible Business?, N.Y. LJ., Sept. 30, 1996, at S2,
also available at <http://www.ljx.com/internet/brother.html>.
47. See Kalow, supra note 26, at 2243.
48. See Electronic Commerce Update, CYBERSPACE LAw., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 28.
49. This information comes from remarks made by President Clinton at
the recent Technology '98 Conference in San Francisco, as reported in
Electronic Commerce Update, CYBERSPACE LAW., May-June 1998, at 25.
50. For a summary of these statistics, see In the News, CYBERSPACE LAW.,
July-Aug. 1998, at 30.
51. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
52. Forrester Research is a company that helps its clients determine the
effects of technology on their businesses, as well as on individual consumers
and society at large. Customers purchase annual memberships to any of twelve
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represent $66 billion in U.S.-related Internet revenues by the
year 2000. 5" The overall Internet economy is expected to
approach $200 billion in the year 2000,5 4 and to surpass $300
billion by 2002. 55 "The march toward an increasingly open elec-
tronic marketplace has already reached the point of no return,"
says Walid Mougayar, president of Toronto-based CYBER-
Management, Inc.56 "Every day," he says, "the electronic com-
merce market gets bigger and bigger, and every day a new
Internet-related business begins to threaten an existing tradi-
tional business."5 7 From all of this we can conclude that the
Internet will continue to demand increasing attention.
II. OVERVIEW
As legislators at both the national and local levels attempt to
create regulatory schemes for Internet commerce, and as both
state and federal courts adjudicate an increasing number of
Internet-based disputes, the importance of better understanding
the implications of regulating the Internet as interstate com-
merce becomes paramount. Clearly, the Internet is evolving and
developing at a much more rapid pace than any other mecha-
nism of commerce. Most scholars, legislators, and practitioners
would agree that the Internet has not reached its final form.
Regulators must be careful not to arrest this evolution. Yet, a
proper regulatory scheme poses the opportunity to make the
Internet more stable, to increase confidence in its ability to
accommodate commercial transactions, and to reduce uncer-
tainty about liability for Internet-based activities. Such a scheme
research services that focus on three main areas-corporate information
technology, new media, and senior management-and consider such issues as
investment and financing decisions, hiring needs, and organizational structure.
Customers include large enterprises and technology vendors. For further
information, consult Hoover's company capsule online (visited February 10,
1998) <http://www.hoovers.com/capsules/52441.html>. Forrester Research
maintains a homepage at <http://www.forrester.com>.
53. See The Web Gets Down to Business, Electronic Commerce '97, <http://
www.pathfinder.com/offers/ecommerce/ecintro.html>. Forrester interviewed
over thirty CEOs and technology executives who are conducting business on
the Internet today.
54. See id.
55. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, THE EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY.
For a summary of these and other statistics contained in the report, see In the
News, supra note 50.
56. WALID MOUGAYAR, OPENING DIGITAL MARKETS: BATrLE PLANS AND
BUSINESS STRATEGIES FOR INTERNET COMMERCE 4 (2d ed. 1997). For more
information about this publication, see (visited February 15, 1998) <http://
www.cyberm.com/>.
57. Id.
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would likely accelerate, rather than arrest, the growth of elec-
tronic commerce and Internet-based technology. The path
toward such a scheme will necessarily require us to answer ques-
tions about how much regulation is appropriate, who should reg-
ulate, and how.
This Note will attempt to contribute to the discussion about
these questions. Part Three of this Note will examine the
Internet itself in greater depth, providing a brief description of
the Internet's origins, its technology, and how it operates. Part
Four explores issues associated with regulating the Internet as
interstate commerce in light of a 1997 ruling by a federal district
court in New York. It evaluates each facet of the ruling with an
eye toward the Commerce Clause's impact, if any, on Internet
regulation by states. Finally, Part Five of this Note will present
some conclusions about whether the district court's ruling
should be followed and whether Congress should act through
legislation to better define the lines of demarcation between
legitimate state interests in regulating the Internet and those
areas which should be regulated exclusively at the federal level.
III. THE INTERNET
In ACLU v. Reno,5 8 a three-judge panel from the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that certain provisions of the Communications Decency Act of
1996-which sought to regulate content transmitted over the
Internet-violated the First Amendment. In its published opin-
ion, the court made numerous factual findings about the nature
of the Internet. Much of my ensuing discussion about the
Internet in this part of the Note relies heavily on the court's find-
58. 929 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In ACLUv. Reno, the plaintiffs filed
suit challenging the constitutionality of provisions of the Communications
Decency Act ("CDA") which sought to protect minors from harmful material on
the Internet. A second suit was filed by additional plaintiffs, and the cases were
consolidated. Eventually the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which held
that: (1) provisions of the CDA prohibiting transmission of obscene or indecent
communications by means of a telecommunications device to persons under
age eighteen, or sending patently offensive communications through the use of
an interactive computer service to persons under age eighteen, were content-
based blanket restrictions on speech, and thus, could not withstand a First
Amendment challenge as time, place, or manner restrictions; (2) the
challenged provisions were facially overbroad in violation of the First
Amendment; and (3) the constitutionality of the provision prohibiting
transmission of obscene or indecent communications by means of a
telecommunications device to persons under age eighteen would be saved from
facial overbreadth challenge by severing term "or indecent" from the statute
pursuant to its severability clause. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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ings for two reasons. First, the findings reflect an accurate
appraisal of the history and capabilities of Internet technology.
Second, because this appraisal has been recognized by a federal
court, other federal courts will likely rely on it in rendering their
own decisions about Internet-based activities.
The United States government created the forerunner of
what we now call the Internet in the late sixties. An experimental
project of the Advanced Research Project Agency ("ARPA"), this
network "linked computers and computer networks owned by
the military, defense contractors, and university laboratories con-
ducting defense-related research."59 It was called ARPANET.6 °
Its purpose was to "create a decentralized system of computers
that would be better able to withstand a nuclear attack by pre-
serving some of the data because it was stored at different loca-
tions."61 The network facilitated a process whereby individual
messages could reach their destinations through any number of
different routes between computers.6 2 In the event of a catastro-
phe or the destruction of some of the computers, vital scientific
and military information could still reach its destination by being
re-routed by those computers still in operation." As the
ARPANET continued to develop,64 other similar networks devel-
oped to link "universities, research facilities, businesses, and indi-
viduals around the world."6 Eventually, as computer use grew
throughout the world, each of these networks were themselves
linked together, in turn creating a "larger international web of
computers:" the modern-day Internet.66
59. 929 F. Supp. at 831. For a good overview of the Internet generally,
see ACLU v. Reno. See also Selin, supra note 34; Amy Knoll, Comment, Any Which
Way But Loose: Nations Regulate the Internet, 4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 275 (1996);
PETER H. SALUS, CASTING THE NET (1995).
60. See 929 F. Supp. at 831.
61. Selin, supra note 34, at 367.
62. "Thus, a message sent from a computer in Washington, D.C., to a
computer in Palo Alto, California, might first be sent to a computer in
Philadelphia, and then be forwarded to a computer in Pittsburgh, and then to
Chicago, Denver, and Salt Lake City, before finally reaching Palo Alto." 929 F.
Supp. at 831.
63. See 929 F. Supp. at 831, 832; Selin, supra note 34, at 367; Knoll, supra
note 59, at 276. "If the message could not travel along [the normal] path
(because of military attack, simple technical malfunction, or other reason), the
message would automatically (without human intervention or even knowledge)
be re-routed . . ." 929 F. Supp. at 832.
64. It subsequently ceased to exist. See 929 F. Supp. at 832.
65. Id.
66. Selin, supra note 34, at 368. Selin further writes, "Scientists in
Germany could operate a telescope in Australia, and academics in Japan could
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The Internet is not a single entity (at least in the traditional
sense). As the court in ACLU v. Reno pointed out,
No single entity-academic, corporate, governmental, or
non-profit-administers the Internet. It exists and func-
tions as a result of the fact that hundreds of thousands of
separate operators of computers and computer networks
independently decided to use common data transfer proto-
cols to exchange communications and information with
other computers (which in turn exchange communica-
tions and information with still other computers). There is
no centralized storage location, control point, or commu-
nications channel for the Internet, and it would not be
technically feasible for a single entity to control all of the
information conveyed on the internet.
67
No one can simply "turn off' the Internet.6" Moreover, it
would be extremely difficult at best to suppress or divert an indi-
vidual message. Messages between computers on the Internet
can be subdivided into smaller "packets" sent independently to
the destination, where the receiving computer can reassemble
them.6 9 Although all packets of a given message often follow the
same path to their destination, "if computers along the route
cooperate on research problems with the United States through this computer
web." Id.
67. 929 F. Supp. at 832 (finding 11).
68. See Selin, supra note 34, at 368-69. He writes, "Short of eliminating
most of the computers or telephone lines in the world, the Internet cannot be
shut down." Id. at 369. Further, he writes,
The closest thing to a nerve center for the Internet is Internic, which
is the sole company that issues domain names .... Even if Internic
were somehow disabled, communications can still occur because each
web site has its own numerical address which allows access separate
from its domain name.
Id. at 369 n.22.
69. See id. at 369 n.22; see also 929 F. Supp. at 832 (finding 9). Selin
provides a more detailed description:
In a typical transaction, a local computer server divides a form of data,
be it an E-mail message or video signal, into multiple portions or
"packets," each packet having a standard size and an address on it.
The computer then sends these packets through its connection with
the Internet. From there, a computer reads the addresses and sends
the packets in the general direction of the destination, using the best
available path at the moment. Individual parts of the message may
end up taking different routes. The same reading and sending
happens at the next intersection, and so on, until the packets reach
their destination. When the packets reach their destination, a
computer waits to receive all of them and then reassembles the data.
There is usually no way to predict which international borders will be
crossed during transmission. Furthermore, once information is
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become overloaded, then packets can be re-routed to less loaded
computers. 7 °
Individual users can access the Internet in several ways. 7 '
Students, faculty, and researchers at educational institutions (pri-
marily universities) throughout the country can access the
Internet through those institutions.72 Many employers link their
office computer networks to the Internet, thereby providing
their employees direct Internet access.73 Many local libraries also
offer their patrons the use of computers that are linked to the
Internet." Numerous individuals utilize Internet service provid-
ers ("ISPs"), or commercial entities offering customers Internet
access through their own computer networks (linked to the
Internet) in exchange for a monthly or hourly fee. 75 Addition-
ally, an increasing number of "storefront computer coffee shops"
provide hot coffee along with Internet access in exchange for a
small hourly fee. 76 Finally, individuals can access the Internet by
using some of the thousands of local dial-in computer services,
often called "bulletin board systems" or "BBSs. 7 7
Upon gaining Internet access, an individual has a variety of
different methods of communication and information exchange
at his or her disposal. The most common methods are one-to-
one messaging (such as e-mail) ,78 one-to-many messaging (such
placed on the Internet, no one can control where it goes or who views
it.
Selin, supra note 34, at 369.
70. 929 F. Supp. at 832 (finding 9).
71. See id. (finding 12).
72. See id. (finding 13).
73. See id. at 832-33 (finding 14).
74. See id. at 833 (finding 16). In addition, many libraries now provide
direct modem access to these computers at no cost to the individual user,
allowing users to access the Internet via these library computers without ever
physically entering the library. See id.
75. See id. (findings 18 & 19). Some of these commercial service
providers, like America Online, Compuserve, Prodigy, or the Microsoft
Network, offer nationwide computer networks, allowing subscribers to dial in to
a local telephone number. In addition to providing access to the resources of
the Internet, they also provide access to their own internal proprietary
networks, available only to their subscribers. These internal proprietary
networks can be quite extensive. See id.
76. Id. (finding 17).
77. See id. (finding 20). BBSs range from single computers to an entire
network of computers and can accommodate anywhere from one to multiple
users at the same time (depending on the configuration of the particular BBS).
Some (but not all) of these systems offer direct and indirect links to the
Internet. Some charge nominal fees. Others are free. See id.
78. See id. at 834 (finding 23). One-to-one messaging is most comparable
to sending a first-class letter through the postal service. However, unlike the
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as a "listserv"),7 distributed message databases (such as
"USENET newsgroups"),8 real-time communication (such as
"Internet Relay Chat"),81 real-time remote computer utilization
postal service, simple e-mail generally is not secure "and can be accessed or
viewed on intermediate computers between the sender and the recipient
(unless the message is encrypted)." Id.
79. See id. (finding 24). Listservs allow communications about particular
subjects of interest to a group of people. The court provides an illustration of
how these listservs work:
[Pleople can subscribe to a "listserv" mailing list on a particular topic
of interest to them. The subscriber can submit messages automatically
or through a human moderator overseeing the listserv, to anyone who
has subscribed to the mailing list. A recipient of such a message can
reply to the message and have the reply also distributed to everyone
on the mailing list. This service provides the capability to keep abreast
of developments or events in a particular subject area. Most listserv-
type mailing lists automatically forward all incoming messages to all
mailing list subscribers. There are thousands of such mailing list
services on the Internet, collectively with hundreds of thousands of
subscribers. Users of "open" listservs typically can add or remove their
names from the mailing list automatically, with no direct human
involvement. Listservs may also be "closed," i.e., only allowing for
one's acceptance into the listserv by a human moderator.
Id.
80. See id. at 834-35 (finding 25). These are similar in function to
listservs, but function differently in the manner in which communications are
transmitted. Unlike listservs, users need not subscribe to the discussion mailing
lists in advance, but rather can access the database at any time. While a small
number of USENET newsgroups are "moderated," most are open access. When
an individual user with access to a USENET server posts (e.g., sends or uploads)
a message to an "open access" newsgroup, the message is then automatically
forwarded to all adjacent USENET servers that furnish access to the newsgroup,
which then propagate the message to the servers adjacent to those servers, and
so on. Using the court's language,
The messages are temporarily stored on each receiving server, where
they are available for review and response by individual users. The
messages are automatically and periodically purged from each system
after a time to make room for new messages. Responses to
messages . . . are automatically distributed to all other computers
receiving the newsgroup or forwarded to a moderator in the case of a
moderated newsgroup. The dissemination of messages to USENET
servers around the world is an automated process that does not
require direct human intervention or review.
Id. at 835. There are currently newsgroups on more than fifteen thousand dif-
ferent subjects. See id. (finding 26).
81. See id. (finding 27). Features like "talk" allow one-to-one
communications "and 'Internet Relay Chat' (or "IRC") allows two or more to
type messages to each other that almost immediately appear on the others'
computer screens." The court states, "IRC is analogous to a telephone party
line, using a computer and keyboard rather than a telephone. With IRC,
however, at any one time there are thousands of different party lines available,
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(such as "telnet"),82 and remote information retrieval (such as
"ftp," "gopher," and the "World Wide Web").8 3 "Most of these
methods of communication can be used to transmit text, data,
computer programs, sound, visual images (such as pictures), and
moving video images. '"84
The World Wide Web has become one of the most popular
resources on the Internet. The World Wide Web is a series of
documents stored in a variety of formats85 by different computers
all over the Internet.86 Each such document has an address
(which functions in a manner similar to that of a telephone
number).87 Most Web documents contain links, which, upon
being selected by the user, pull up another document, irrespec-
tive of where in the world it is actually stored.88 Many organiza-
tions now have "home pages" on the Web. Home pages serve as
"hubs" full of links that refer users to other documents with more
in which collectively tens of thousands of users are engaging in conversations
on a huge range of subjects." Id.
82. See id. (finding 29). "[U]sing telnet, a researcher at a university, for
example, would be able to use the computing power of a supercomputer
located at a different university. A student can use telnet to connect to a
remote library to access the library's online card catalog program." Id.
83. See id. at 835-36 (findings 30 through 33). There are three primary
methods to locate and retrieve information on the Internet. File transfer
protocol or "ftp," refers to a simple method by which a user can obtain a list of
computer files available on a remote computer, and transfer one or more of
those to his or her own computer. See id. (finding 31). The second method
.uses a program and format named 'gopher' to guide an individual's search
through the resources available on a remote computer." Id. (finding 32). The
third method, and perhaps the most well known, is the "World Wide Web."
The Web utilizes a formatting language called hypertext markup language
(HTML). "[P]rograms that browse the Web can display HTML documents
containing text, images, sound, animation, and moving video. Any HTML
document can include links to other types of information or resources, so that
while viewing an HTML document that, for example, describes resources
available on the Internet, one can 'click' using a computer mouse on the
description of the resource and be immediately connected to the resource
itself." Id. (finding 33).
84. Id. at 834 (finding 22).
85. Formats include, but are not limited to, text, still images, sounds, and
video.
86. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836 (finding 36).
87. See id.
88. See id. The court further states, "Links for example are used to lead
from overview documents to more detailed documents, from tables of contents
to particular pages, but [are] also [used] as cross-references, footnotes, and
new forms of information structure." Id. "These links from one computer to
another, from one document to another across the Internet, are what unify the
Web into a single body of knowledge, and what makes the Web unique." Id.
(finding 39).
WHO SHOULD REGULATE COMMERCE ON THE INTERNET?
specific information regarding certain aspects of the organiza-
tion. 9 The Web is, in essence, a giant "platform through which
people and organizations can communicate through shared
information."9"
When a user makes information available, that information
is said to be "published" on the Web. 9 As long as the informa-
tion published has been formatted according to Web standards,
other users will be able to view it.92 These standards are sophisti-
cated and flexible enough to allow a variety of organizations to
publish Web documents, including banks, corporations, newspa-
pers, and magazines (which now publish online versions of their
material), government agencies, and even some courts.9 3 Yet
publishing on the Web is still simple enough to allow individuals
and smaller community organizations to publish their own per-
sonal home pages. Because the standards are uniform and util-
ize a common language, they allow computers that would
otherwise be incompatible with each other to communicate on
the Web.94 Individual Web sites can be open to the general pub-
lic or closed, such that only those with advance authorization
may access them.
9 5
To search the Web, a variety of "search engines" have devel-
oped which allow users of the Web to search particular informa-
tion in all of the public sites that are part of the Web.96 Most
such searches are performed by requesting that the search
engines locate all of the public sites which contain one or a
group of specified key words pertinent to the topic on which
information is sought. Because of the way the Web is organized
and configured, no single organization can control any member-
ship in the Web, "nor is there any single centralized point from
89. See id. (finding 37).
90. Id. at 837 (finding 40).
91. See id. The court further states:
Publishing on the Web simply requires that the 'publisher' has a
computer connected to the Internet and that the computer is running
[Web] server software. The computer can be as small as a personal
computer costing less than $1500... or as complex as a multi-million
dollar mainframe computer. Many Web publishers choose instead to
lease disk storage space from someone else who has the necessary
computer facilities, eliminating the need for actually owning any
equipment oneself.
Id.
92. See id. (finding 42).
93. See id.
94. See id. at 838 (finding 45).
95. See id. (finding 43).
96. See id. (finding 44).
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which individual Web sites or services can be blocked from the
Web.""
IV. THE INTERNET As COMMERCE
Numerous states have attempted to regulate the Internet.
Most attempts have dealt with content and indecency.9" The
U.S. Supreme Court's recent opinion in Reno v. ACLU99 suggests
that many challenges to such state laws will concentrate on First
Amendment issues.1 °0 While much of the initial state regulation
sought to restrict indecent or obscene content on the Internet,
state legislatures have become increasingly concerned with regu-
lating and "harnessing" Internet-based commercial transac-
tions.101 These state attempts at regulation vary widely, and have
focused on areas such as taxation,1 °2 consumer protection,103
97. Id. at 838 (finding 46).
98. Maryland legislators recently attempted "to extend a law concerning
telephone misuse to encompass 'obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent'
electronic mail and online communications . . . . Similar legislation was
introduced in New York and was passed in Connecticut in 1995." Wendy R.
Leibowitz, Maryland is Trying to Ban Lewd E-Mail, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 24, 1997, at
B1.
99. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
100. See Hameline & Miles, supra note 30, at 21.
101. See id.
102. See id. Some states have created study groups to deal with the issues
involved with applying existing tax codes to Internet-based commerce. For
example, the California Legislature created the California Internet Review
Commission to examine the feasibility of applying sales taxes to the Internet.
See David Hipschman, Get Ready, They're Trying to Tax Commerce on the Internet,
LEDGER, Mar. 17, 1996, at DlI. Resulting in part from the Commission's
findings, California currently has a three-year moratorium on the imposition of
new, so-called discriminatory Internet taxes. Governor Wilson signed this bill
into law last August. The bill closely parallels the Internet Tax Freedom Act that
the 105th Congress passed in October. For good discussions of issues
associated with state taxation of Internet-based commerce, see Ashraf, supra
note 29; Grierson, supra note 29.
103. Hameline and Miles cite the recent action taken by the California
Legislature to amend § 17538 of its Business and Professions Code to include
the requirement "that a vendor conducting business over the Internet or any
other electronic means of communication make certain disclosures to a buyer."
Hameline & Miles, supra note 30, at 22 (citing A.B. 3320 (approved in
September 1996)). A violation of this provision is a misdemeanor. See id. For
other examples, see Minnesota's Electronic Authentication Act, enacted on
May 19, 1997. A number of states have provided for certification authorities
("CAs"), which are organizations that serve to verify and authenticate
individuals' or companies' digital signatures after requiring that the individual
or company provide the certification authority with reliable evidence of
identity. Twenty-seven states have already enacted digital signature legislation
of some kind. Nine other states have either introduced digital signature
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advertising, ° 4 anti-gambling provisions, 1° 5 anonymity, 1 0 6 and
trademark protection measures.107 While some states have been
quite ambitious in their attempts to regulate Internet commerce,
others have refrained, citing a fear of overburdening a techno-
logical medium still in the midst of evolution. 108 Nevertheless,
legislation or are still in the process of drafting it. For current summaries and
status updates on digital signature legislation at the state level, see the McBride,
Baker & Coles Summary of Electronic Commerce and Digital Signature
Legislation Web pages, available at <http://www.mbc.com/ds-sum.html>. For
more information about CAs and digital signatures, see Maureen S. Dorney,
Digital Signature Legislation, 491 PLI/PAT. 141 (1997). See also Georgia's law
prohibiting Internet users from falsely identifying themselves online, infra note
106.
104. For example, both Texas and Florida have decided that law firm
Web pages (even those of out-of-state firms) "are subject to the rules of
professional conduct applicable to attorney advertising." American Libraries
Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
105. In a recent article in the Legal Times, Professor Post predicted that
gambling on the Internet will soon explode into a multimillion dollar business
and observed that the legal rules curbing such behavior are ill-equipped to deal
with such a boom. See David Post, Gambling on a Regulatory Fix, LEGAL TIMES,
June 23, 1997, at 31. The Attorney General of Minnesota has banned gambling
on the Internet and has actually brought civil enforcement actions against
nonresident offenders. See, e.g., State of Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts,
Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431 (D. Minn. Dec 11, 1996). See also <http:
//www.ag.state.mn.us/home/consumer/consumernews/OnlineScams/memo.
html> (Minnesota's Attorney General's Web site warning those who transmit
information on the Internet into Minnesota that they are subject to jurisdiction
in Minnesota) (visited March 10, 1999). For a good discussion of the
challenges associated with gambling on the Internet, see Seth Gorman &
Antony Loo, Blackjack or Bust: Can U.S. Law Stop Internet Gambling?, 16 Loy. L.A.
ENT. L.J. 667 (1996); Scott M. Montpas, Comment, Gambling On-Line: For a
Hundred Dollars, I Bet You Government Regulation Will Not Stop the Newest Form of
Gambling, 22 DAYrON L. REv. 163 (1996); Nicholas Robbins, Baby Needs a New
Pair of Cybershoes: The Legality of Casino Gambling on the Internet, 2 B.U. J. Sci. &
TECH. L. 7 (1996).
106. As noted in American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, "the Georgia legislature
has enacted a recent law prohibiting Internet users from 'falsely identifying'
themselves online." 969 F. Supp. at 168 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1
(1981)).
107. In 1996, for example, the California Legislature considered a bill
that would have prohibited a person from using a company's trademark as an e-
mail address without its permission. Hameline & Miles, supra note 30, at 23
(citing Ilana DeBare, State Trademark Bill Ignites Net Turmoi4 SACRAMENTO BEE,
March 2, 1996, at Fl).
108. By way of illustration, consider the following. "Minnesota has
aggressively pursued out-of-state advertisers and service providers who reach
Minnesotans via the Internet; Illinois has also been assertive in using existing
laws to reach out-of-state actors whose connection to Illinois occurs only by
virtue of an Internet communication.... Florida has taken the opposite route,
declining to venture into online law enforcement until various legal issues ...
have been determined." American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 168.
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there seems to be no shortage of new legislative proposals. The
regulatory environment among the states is thus rapidly chang-
ing, somewhat unpredictable, and enshrouded in great debate.
As the debate over how to regulate the Internet rages on,
however, both federal and state courts, faced with the necessity of
resolving the Internet-based disputes before them, must find
readily workable solutions, even amidst the absence of statutory
guidance on a particular issue. Thus, judicial resolution will con-
tinue to draw new lines in previously uncharted territory. In
some instances, judicial resolution can forestall or preempt cer-
tain types of legislative action, better defining (for better or for
worse) the future course of any legal or regulatory paradigm for
the Internet.
This is precisely what happened on June 20, 1997, when a
federal district court judge in the Southern District of New York
temporarily restrained the enforcement of New York's Internet
Decency Law.109 The controversy began when various organiza-
tions that use the Internet to communicate brought an action
challenging the constitutionality of a New York statute criminaliz-
ing any use of a computer to disseminate obscene material to
minors. 1 ' The plaintiffs challenged the New York statute on
First Amendment and dormant Commerce Clause grounds.
Judge Preska held that the statute violated the dormant Com-
merce Clause."' Her opinion in this case, American Libraries
Ass'n v. Pataki,"2 represents the first attempt at judicial resolu-
tion of numerous commerce-related issues on which Congress, to
date, has been silent. If Judge Preska's resolution is followed by
other federal courts, this case will substantially affect the future
course of any legal or regulatory paradigm for the Internet.
What does this opinion portend for the Internet? Should it
be upheld? Should it be followed by other federal courts? And if
so, what kind of options does this give Congress? Judge Preska's
opinion provides an ideal context for a broader discussion that
concerns the Commerce Clause's impact on Internet regulation
by states. This section of the Note analyzes the American Libraries
109. See American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 160. The June 20 order
can be found on the ACLU home page, <http://www.ACLU.org>. New York's
Internet Decency law closely resembled the CDA, of which several provisions
were struck down in Reno. The relevant provisions of the New York law can be
found at N.Y. PENAL LAw § 235.21 (Consol. 1998).
110. See American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 163.
111. See id. at 169. For an analysis of this decision and its implications, see
Hameline & Miles, supra note 30.
112. 969 F. Supp. 160.
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Ass'n opinion, discusses the opinion's validity, and whether
courts should follow it.
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
We begin with the Commerce Clause. The Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution states that "[t]he Con-
gress shall have Power. .. To regulate Commerce.. . among the
several States .... 113 One commentator has succinctly observed
that the Commerce Clause has three basic purposes: (1) creating
and maintaining a "federal free trade unit," (2) fostering "mate-
rial success," and (3) promoting "the peace and safety of the
Union." '14 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the clause not
only empowers Congress to regulate interstate commerce, but
also thwarts the states' power to enact laws that interfere with
interstate commerce.1" 5 This latter function pertains to its "dor-
mant" aspect."1 6 The Court has repeatedly declared that the
main precept behind its dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence is the prevention of "economic protectionism."" 7 In Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 18 the Court stated that " [t] he negative
or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state
taxation or regulation that discriminates against or unduly bur-
dens interstate commerce and thereby 'imped[es] free private
113. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3.
114. See Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 Micn. L. REv. 395, 398-99 (1989).
115. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 317-19
(1851); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 559 (1849); Willson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1, 5-6 (1824).
116. The dormant Commerce Clause has been the subject of a
resurgence of both scholarly and judicial concern. See Coenen, supra note 114;
Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST.
COMMENT. 395 (1986); Richard D. Friedman, Putting the Dormancy Doctrine Out of
Its Misery, 12 CARnozo L. REv. 1745 (1991); Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation
is Too Much-An Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 47 (1981); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce
Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569 (1987);
Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091 (1986); Robert A. Sedler, The
Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An
Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REv. 885 (1985); Mark V.
Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125 (1979);
Amy M. Petragnani, Comment, The Dormant Commerce Clause: On Its Last Leg, 57
ALB. L. REv. 1215, 1243 (1994).
117. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192-93
(1994); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988); see also
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984).
118. 519 U.S. 278 (1997).
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trade in the national marketplace."'' 9 Thus, a state regulation
found to be discriminatory or unduly burdensome to interstate
commerce will be invalidated, even though it might concern an
area that Congress has chosen not to regulate. The Supreme
Court has used dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to
invalidate a large number of state regulations affecting interstate
commerce.
120
B. American Libraries Association v. Pataki: A Good Opinion?
In American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, Judge Preska begins her
dormant Commerce Clause analysis with a brief discussion of
three ways that courts have used the clause to invalidate state leg-
islation. First, the clause prohibits discrimination aimed directly
at interstate commerce.1 21 Second, the clause bars state regula-
tions that, although facially nondiscriminatory, unduly burden
interstate commerce. 122 Third, courts have "long held that state
regulation of those aspects of commerce that by their unique
nature demand cohesive national treatment is offensive to the
Commerce Clause." 123
In applying the dormant Commerce Clause to the chal-
lenged New York Act, Judge Preska first inquires whether the Act
"concerns" interstate commerce such that it would trigger dor-
mant Commerce Clause scrutiny. 124 She begins by looking at the
plain language of the Act. "By its terms," she concludes, "the Act
applies to any communication, intrastate or interstate, that fits
within the prohibition and over which New York has the capacity
to exercise criminal jurisdiction." 125 Next, she examines the
Act's legislative history, which she finds to evince the New York
legislators' understanding and intent that the Act would apply to
communications between New Yorkers and parties outside the
119. Id. at 287 (alteration in original, citations omitted) (quoting Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980)).
120. For example, the Court has used the clause to invalidate train length
restrictions (see Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761
(1945)), truck length prohibitions (see Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981)), and various provisions regulating produce (see
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)).
121. See American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)).
122. See 969 F. Supp. at 169 (citing Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662 (1981)).
123. Id. at 169 (citing Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557
(1886)).
124. Id. at 169-73.
125. Id. at 169-70.
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state.12 6 Finally, she concludes that the interstate nature of the
Internet itself provides perhaps the "strongest support" for apply-
ing dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.1 2 7
Having concluded that dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny
applies, Judge Preska next inquires whether the communicative
activity over the Internet, which the challenged provisions of the
Act proscribes, is "commerce" within the meaning of the Com-
merce Clause. Noting that the definitions of commerce used by
the U.S. Supreme Court have been very broad, Judge Preska
answers this inquiry affirmatively, 128 even though the parties to
the case stipulated that the Internet is not exclusively or even
primarily a means of commercial communication.129 Noting that
the Supreme Court has held that the dormant Commerce Clause
is applicable to activities undertaken without a profit motive,'
Judge Preska holds that the stipulation "cannot insulate the stat-
ute at issue from Commerce Clause scrutiny." '' She also notes
that the Internet serves more than just communicative functions.
Analogizing the Internet to railroads, trucks, and highways, she
writes, "[t] he Internet is more than a means of communication;
it also serves as a conduit for transporting digitized goods, includ-
ing software, data, music, graphics, and videos which can be
downloaded from the provider's site to the Internet user's com-
puter."13 She concludes that "the Internet represents an instru-
ment of interstate commerce, albeit an innovative one; the
novelty of the technology should not obscure the fact that regula-
126. See id. at 170.
127. Id. at 170-72. Judge Preska considers many of the same aspects of
the Internet set forth above, such as its insensitivity to geographic distinctions,
the inability of a state to shut out Internet users from another state, the inability
of an individual user to discover the physical location of a recipient to whom
that person might address an Internet communication, and the packet
switching and caching features of Internet data exchange. See id.
128. See id. at 173.
129. See id. at 172.
130. In support of this contention, Judge Preska cites Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court
examined the constitutionality of a California statute prohibiting the transport
of indigent people into the state. The Court invalidated the statute as violative
of the dormant Commerce Clause, reasoning that "the transportation of
persons is 'commerce' and that the California law at issue raised an
unconstitutional barrier to that commerce." 314 U.S. at 172-73. "In making its
threshold determination, the Court emphasized that [i]t is immaterial whether
or not the transportation is commercial in character." 314 U.S. at 172 n.1.
131. 969 F. Supp. at 172.
132. Id. at 173
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tion of the Internet impels traditional Commerce Clause
considerations."
133
1. The Three Modes of Analysis Under the Dormant
Commerce Clause
Since the Act does trigger dormant Commerce Clause scru-
tiny, Judge Preska proceeds to scrutinize the Act under three
independent modes of analysis, each mode corresponding to
one of the three ways that courts have used the dormant Com-
merce Clause to invalidate state legislation.13 1 We now turn to
her analysis under these modes.
a. Prohibition of Discrimination Aimed Directly at
Interstate Commerce
Judge Preska finds that "New York has deliberately imposed
its legislation on the Internet and, by doing so, projected its law
into other states whose citizens use the Net. 1 35 To reach this
finding, she first considers the implications of Edgar v. MITE, 3 6 a
case in which the Supreme Court held that a regulation having
the "practical effect" of regulating transactions which take place
across state lines, exceeds the "inherent limits of the State's
power," irrespective of the legislators' intentions. 137 Hameline
and Miles believe that Judge Preska's use of this opinion indi-
cates that she "viewed this law as not merely discriminating
against out-of-state interests, but as a deliberate attempt to regu-
late the activities of residents of other states."'3 8
Noting that the "extraterritoriality" analysis used in Edgar
found support from only a plurality of the Court, Judge Preska
cites Healy v. The Beer Institute13 9 as a majority opinion expressly
adopting this same type of analysis.1 4 ° In that case, the Court
examined the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute requiring
out-of-state beer shippers to affirm that their prices were no
higher than the prices charged in the bordering states at the
time of the affirmation.'4 1 The Healy Court derived three guid-
ing principles from its prior caselaw. "First, the Commerce
133. Id.
134. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
135. American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 177.
136. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
137. American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 174 (citing Edgar v. MITE,
457 U.S. at 64243).
138. Hameline & Miles, supra note 30, at 21.
139. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
140. American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 175.
141. See id.
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Clause . ..precludes the application of a state statute to com-
merce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders,
whether or not the commerce has effects within the state." '142
Second, a statute that directly controls commerce occurring
wholly outside the boundaries of a state exceeds the inherent
limits of that state's authority, and is invalid even if the legislature
did not intend the statute's extraterritorial reach. 4 ' Third, the
practical effect of the statute must be evaluated not only by con-
sidering the consequences of the statute, but more importantly,
by hypothesizing the statute's impact if many other states
adopted similar legislation.144 Under this analysis, the Court
invalidated the Connecticut statute as "per se" violative of the
dormant Commerce Clause.
14 5
Judge Preska's use of the Edgar/Healy analysis provides sub-
stantial support for her premise that any attempt to deliberately
regulate trade in other states is per se violative of the dormant
Commerce Clause. Her conclusion, however, that the New York
Act reflected an attempt to deliberately regulate Internet activity
in other states, depends on another premise crucial to the out-
come. To reach her conclusion, she must prove that the
Internet's very nature makes it impossible to restrict the effects of
the New York Act to conduct occurring within New York. With-
out citing specific evidence or support, Judge Preska states that
"[a] n Internet user may not intend that a message be accessible
to New Yorkers, but lacks the ability to prevent New Yorkers from
visiting a particular Web site or viewing a particular newsgroup
posting or receiving a particular mail exploder. '' 4 6
As discussed above, however, individual Web sites can be
closed to the general public, such that only those with advance
authorization may access them. 4 7 By maintaining a closed Web
site, an Internet site owner does have the ability to prevent New
Yorkers or, for that matter, any other particular group of users,
from accessing the site without advance authorization. Similarly,
any listserv can also be closed such that advance authorization in
the form of an encryption code or password would be required
142. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 177 ("This encroachment
upon the authority which the Constitution specifically confers upon the federal
government and upon the sovereignty of New York's sister states is per se
violative of the Commerce Clause.").
146. 969 F. Supp. at 177.
147. See supra text accompanying note 95.
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to access it."' Currently a small number of USENET newsgroups
are "moderated," or closed.14 9 Finally, e-mail communications
can be encrypted, such that recipients for whom the messages
were never intended are not able to decode them.150 This sug-
gests that an Internet user does not "lack" the ability to prevent
New Yorkers from receiving the material that user disseminates.
This would seem to undermine judge Preska's premise that
"the nature of the Internet makes it impossible to restrict the
effects of the New York Act to conduct occurring within New
York. 1 1' 5  Certainly, the nature of the Internet makes this task
more difficult, but hardly impossible. Advance authorization to
access a Web site or newsgroup, or to receive certain types of e-
mail messages, represents a way that owners of Web sites, new-
sgroups, and listservs could protect themselves from violating the
provisions of the New York Act. While this is not currently the
norm on the Internet, and it would certainly lessen the ease of
access non-minors have to indecent or obscene material, the pro-
cess would be quite simple in operation and would resemble that
of a magazine subscription solicitation.
Under a system of advance authorization, a user maintaining
a Web site that contains obscene or indecent material would util-
ize a homepage devoid of such material, but with a non-offensive
verbal description of what the Web site contains. This descrip-
tion would obviously need to be crafted in a manner that does
not violate any state or federal law. The additional pages within
the Web site would be open only to those who obtained advance
authorization in the form of an encryption code or a password.
And to obtain this advance authorization, the prospective sub-
scriber to this Web site would need to fill out a subscription
agreement providing information like the user's home mailing
address, telephone number, full name, and age. The user's sig-
nature would certify that the information provided, including
age and location, is true and accurate. The user would then
enclose payment, in the form of a check or a credit card number,
along with the subscription form, in an envelope. The user
would then mail it (not electronically, but via regular mail) to the
mailing address of the Web site owner. Upon receiving the
signed subscription form, the Web site owner would issue a pass-
word to the subscriber, and send it to the subscriber via regular
148. See supra note 79.
149. See supra note 80.
150. See supra note 78.
151. American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 177.
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mail. The Web site owner might also bill the subscriber for
access time (e.g., a set rate per minute).
This process avoids dissemination of indecent or obscene
material to minors, the primary goal of the New York Act. By
using an independent means of communication like regular
mail, it avoids the problems associated with verification of loca-
tion and identity on the Internet. 152 Moreover, it avails the trans-
action of the federal anti-mail fraud provisions.1 53 Since the
agreement would be in writing, and signed by the user, it avoids
evidentiary problems associated with authentication of electronic
documents. A smart owner of a Web site, newsgroup, or listserv
would certainly be wise to take measures like deactivating old
passwords and issuing new ones at regular time intervals. This
would ensure that the owner maintains close tabs on the sub-
scribers' locations, lest they relocate into a jurisdiction with dif-
ferent rules.154 Any subscriber who moves to another state would
notify the owner of his or her change in address. Otherwise, the
subscriber would never receive the new password or encryption
code necessary for future access.
There are strong arguments against this sort of a system,
however. It would place a burden on owners of Web sites, new-
sgroups, and listservs who, regardless of their location, choose to
operate in those states with legislative provisions similar to the
New York Act at issue here. This burden would increase transac-
tion costs by forcing these owners to (1) stay current on regula-
tory developments concerning the Internet in all states where
subscriptions might be sought, (2) maintain detailed records of
all the subscribers involved, (3) maintain different access pack-
ages for different subscribers depending on their specific juris-
152. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1998) (imposing criminal penalties for,
inter alia, knowingly making or using any false writing or document within the
jurisdiction of the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1998) (imposing criminal
penalties for knowing use of the mails for fraudulent purposes); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1342 (1998) (imposing criminal penalties for the use of a fictitious name or
address in the mails). See also, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (1998) (imposing
liability for use of the mails to knowingly deliver false, misleading, or inaccurate
reports concerning crop or commodity conditions); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77i &
77q(a) (1)-(3) (1998) (imposing liability for fraud in connection with the sale,
offer, or exchange of a security through the use of the mails or other means of
interstate commerce).
154. The owner might be wise to take additional precautions like
obtaining indemnification from the subscriber for any liability arising from the
subscriber's Internet activities and including in the subscription agreement a
provision in which the subscriber agrees not to use the service in certain
proscribed states (such as those with more stringent restrictions on content, or
those from which the owner is unwilling to accept subscribers).
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diction, (4) bill customers and keep accurate records of their
accounts, and (5) hire, train, and manage personnel to do all
this, depending on the size and scope of the operation. The
increased transaction costs would no doubt shut out many cur-
rent owners unable to afford them. Probably the highest cost
would be that of keeping current on all the regulatory develop-
ments and maintaining a separate program for each state from
which the owner accepts subscribers.
Moreover, this sort of a system violates the inherent nature
of the Internet. As the Internet has evolved, it has given rise to a
commercial culture quite comfortable with high-speed transac-
tions between parties who have never met outside of cyberspace.
A system that relies on the postal service for security goes against
the grain of a technological medium that offers convenience and
speed as its primary perks. This sort of system might repel those
who have become accustomed to the Internet's expanding pro-
pensity to provide instant gratification for a wide variety of con-
sumer desires.
Additionally, the subscription agreements, no matter how
well crafted, might not be enough to insulate a site owner or
Internet disseminator from liability, should one of the subscrib-
ers decide to access material in a state that prohibits such mate-
rial while traveling through that state on a plane or in a train.
This would provide an incentive for site owners and Internet dis-
seminators to use one subscription agreement tailored to the
restrictions imposed by all the states. Under such a scenario,
however, the site owners and Internet disseminators would be
hard-pressed to continuously update their subscription agree-
ments to conform with the rapidly changing landscape of state
regulation. Worse yet, the state whose restrictions were the most
comprehensive would be dictating the terms of Internet access to
subscribers in all the other states. This is the precise sort of
result that the dormant Commerce Clause would seem to
preclude.
Much of the material that would fall within the auspices of
the New York Act, however, is currently provided by owners who
charge fees to users seeking to access their sites.155 Usually, this
entails obtaining a credit card number which the user enters
onto an electronic form furnished at the home page. Under the
155. Most of the Internet sites which disseminate obscene or indecent
material have home pages which require users to submit age verification
agreements, which include the user's home address and telephone number,
and also to submit the user's credit card number before granting access to the
links to the site's other Web pages which contain the obscene or indecent
material.
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scenario discussed above, if the transaction costs for the owners
go up, we can expect that the owners will pass these additional
costs along to the subscribers. And as the subscription expenses
for subscribers increase, we can expect that some subscribers will
determine that the expenses outweigh the benefits. Others
might be unwilling to disclose their identity. These subscribers
will cancel their subscriptions. The corresponding decrease in
the number of subscribers may have the effect of shutting some
additional site owners and Internet disseminators out of the mar-
ket. Those who remain will compete for subscribers, which will
create price competition. Thus, while subscription fees for sub-
scribers may increase, the increase in price will be tempered by
competition between site owners and Internet disseminators.
The New York Act is simply incapable of resolving other
problems. This type of scheme would have no force against for-
eign owners disseminating indecent or obscene material over the
World Wide Web. It would have no force against anonymous
owners or against hackers who create temporary Web sites for the
purpose of disseminating indecent or obscene materials. Many
who fall in the latter group would be difficult, if not impossible,
to trace. Moreover, because these types of owners do not neces-
sarily attempt to make a profit by posting indecent or obscene
images on the Web, they would have no incentive to use the sub-
scription system. And many of these types of owners, because
their budgets and their operations are so small, are poorly
informed about different state regulatory developments.
These problems, however, are not the same sorts of
problems faced by owners seeking to abide by the Act. Unlike
those problems, these problems exist independently of any legis-
lative scheme in force. These problems are inherent to the
Internet, and would still exist irrespective of the New York Act's
enforcement. They would exist whether the Internet was regu-
lated at the state level or at the federal level. Thus, these
problems are not related to the legislation.
Opponents of a system of advance authorization will no
doubt point to the risk that valid passwords could be passed
along to minors who could then log on to Web sites disseminat-
ing illicit material without any knowledge by the site owners and
Internet disseminators that a minor had accessed them. This is a
valid objection. Site owners could certainly reduce this risk by
billing their subscribers for the time they spend on the site. No
subscriber would want to be billed for Internet time used by
someone else. Thus, a subscriber would have little incentive to
relinquish his or her password, and in the event of discovering
unauthorized use, would have every incentive to immediately
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contact the site owner and request that a new password be issued.
Nevertheless, aside from reliance on a subscriber's good faith,
there would be no assurance that the passwords would not be
abused. A purported subscriber could certainly sell the use of his
or her password to a minor without any knowledge on the part of
the site owner. Under such circumstances, the site owner/dis-
seminator could defend itself from liability by asserting that it
was the subscriber, not the owner, who disseminated the inde-
cent or obscene material to the minor. Nevertheless, the slim
likelihood of being discovered would gravitate heavily in favor of
a subscriber undertaking such deception, especially for subscrib-
ers willing to take the risk in exchange for some extra cash. A
system that allows this to happen might strike us as inadequate.
Relying on a system of advance authorization is not as outra-
geous as it might seem, however. This is exactly how Lexis-Nexis
and Westlaw operate. 156 In many respects, this system's opera-
tion is analogous to the way many credit card companies operate.
Many interactive cable television services and satellite television
services issue access codes to parents which could quite easily end
up in their children's hands. 157 There always exists the possibil-
ity that a minor will obtain a fake driver's license and successfully
purchase alcoholic beverages at a liquor store. Perhaps even
more probable is that the minor will find someone else old
enough to buy the liquor for the minor in exchange for a favor
or some extra cash. There always exists the possibility that por-
nographic magazines will be inadvertently sold to a minor or that
the video store clerk will rent a movie with indecent content to a
minor. In some cases, perhaps the sale or dissemination will be
purposeful.
That this type of behavior occurs, and often without anyone
else's knowledge, does not lead us to excoriate the laws that regu-
late these areas. We do not emasculate these provisions because,
156. Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw are legal databases which contain, among
other things, the text of many federal and state court opinions, federal and
state statutes, secondary sources such as law journal articles, and recent news
from the legal profession as well as general news. Both Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw
issue passwords which their subscribers must enter as a pre-requisite to network
access. The passwords are not issued over the Internet, but through alternative
means: directly from a representative, for example, or through regular mail.
Without a valid password, access to Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis simply is not
possible.
157. For example, this is one feature widely advertised by DirectTV,
which allows subscribers to this satellite television service to use their Digital
Satellite Systems (or DSS units) to place a "parent lock" on material that
parents feel is unsuitable for their children. Once the lock is activated, the
material can be accessed only through the use of an authorization code.
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for the most part, this type of behavior is the exception, not the
norm. Fear of being caught, being imprisoned, losing one's
liquor license, having one's business closed, and fear of other
sanctions thwarts those individuals who would otherwise have no
compunction about violating regulations such as the New York
Act. We accept that no piece of legislation is perfect, and that
there will always be a tiny fraction of the populace who succeed
in subverting the law. In the case of the Internet, the fact that
newer technology is involved does not mean that the situations
mentioned above are no longer analogous.
We can conclude from the foregoing analysis that deliberate
attempts at Internet regulation are not coterminous with deliber-
ate attempts at regulating the affairs of other states. Because the
nature of the Internet does make it possible for owners/dissemi-
nators to use subscription agreements to restrict the effects of the
New York Act to conduct occurring within New York, it would
seem that the Act, while deliberately imposed on the Internet, is
not a deliberate projection of New York law into other states whose
citizens use the Net. This supports the conclusion that the New
York Act need not be construed as being incapable of restriction
to conduct occurring within New York. At a minimum, this sheds
questionable light on Judge Preska's conclusion under the first
mode of analysis. The New York Act need not necessarily be con-
strued as direct discrimination against interstate commerce.
Thus, it need not be regarded as "per se violative of the Com-
merce Clause." 58
It is also true, however, that if states other than New York
enacted incongruent legislation concerning the same matters as
concerns the New York Act, it would create a patchwork of incon-
sistent state obligations. These inconsistent obligations would
make it much more difficult for owners of Web sites, USENET
groups, and listservs to conduct business in all the states. Indeed,
such an environment might even create incentives for owners to
completely abandon any effort to obtain subscribers in certain
states. This hypothetical situation is precisely what is demanded
by the third prong of the Healy analysis, i.e., considering the prac-
tical effect of the statute by hypothesizing the statute's impact if
many other states adopted similar legislation. But under such a
scenario, none of the individual state laws would be per se viola-
tive of the Commerce Clause. Rather, they would impose an
undue burden on interstate commerce such that any benefits of
these individual state provisions would not outweigh the overall
158. American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 177 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
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burden they would impose on the Internet. The second mode of
analysis employs precisely this type of balancing test, and it is to
this mode that Judge Preska next turns.
b. Probibition of Undue Burdens on Interstate Commerce
Under the second mode of analysis, Judge Preska is con-
cerned with indirect regulation of interstate commerce.1 59 The
U.S. Supreme Court set forth the balancing test applicable to
indirect regulations of interstate commerce in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.16 This test employs a two-fold inquiry. First, the
legitimacy of the state's interest is examined. Second, the bur-
den that the state's statute imposes on interstate commerce is
weighed in light of the local benefit it confers on the citizens of
that state.
Judge Preska utilizes this test to evaluate the New York Act.
She first concludes that the protection of children is a legitimate
state interest.1 6  Turning to the second aspect of the test, she
finds that the unique nature of the Internet and the jurisdic-
tional constraints on enforcement would likely impair the Act
from achieving its intended effect of keeping obscene materials
from minors in New York, while the Act's burden on interstate
commerce outweighs the local benefit. In discussing the jurisdic-
tional problems, she notes that "[n] early half of Internet commu-
nications originate outside the United States. 1 62 She also notes
159. See id. at 177. As Judge Preska observes, the distinction between
direct versus indirect regulations of interstate commerce is unclear:
The distinction between direct regulations of interstate commerce,
which are subject to a per se rule of invalidation, and indirect
regulations subject to the less stringent balancing test has never been
sharply defined. In either situation, however, the "critical
consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both local and
interstate activity."
Id. n.8 (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York Liquor Auth., 476
U.S. 573, 579 (1986); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440-
41 (1978)).
160. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
161. See American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 177. Judge Preska cites
several cases in support of this contention. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 756-57 (1982) ("It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's
interest in 'safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is
Icompelling."') (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,
607 (1982)); see also Sable v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115,
126 (1989) ("[T]here is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and
psychological well-being of minors. This interest extends to shielding minors
from the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards.").
162. See American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 178 (quoting ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
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that any attempt by New York to prosecute an out-of-state individ-
ual whose only contact with New York occurs via the Internet "is
beset with practical difficulties, even if New York is able to exer-
cise criminal jurisdiction over such parties." '163 "The prospect of
New York bounty hunters dragging pedophiles from the other 49
states into New York," she remarks, "is not consistent with tradi-
tional concepts of comity. '"164 Thus, any local benefit of the Act
is limited to those cases which New York is realistically able to
prosecute. 165
Judge Preska finds that the local benefits of the Act are fur-
ther limited insofar as many of the Act's objectives can already be
accomplished through "vigorous enforcement of the existing
laws criminalizing obscenity and child pornography." '66 "The
local benefit to be derived from the challenged section of the
statute," she concludes, "is therefore confined to that narrow
class of cases that does not fit within the parameters of any other
law."
16 7
The same practical problems associated with prosecuting
out-of-state individuals under the New York Act, however, would
no doubt present themselves when existing laws criminalizing
child pornography and obscenity are applied to Internet-based
activity. Therefore, the benefits of vigorously enforcing existing
laws to Internet-based activity might also be minimal, and such
laws as applied to the Internet might be susceptible to the same
dormant Commerce Clause challenge as the Act at issue in this
case. Judge Preska does not address this possibility.
"Balanced against the limited local benefits resulting from
the Act," Judge Preska finds, "is an extreme burden on interstate
commerce."16 For one thing, the range of communications
potentially affected by the Act is quite large, and could include
famous works of authorship such as Hucklebery Finn by Mark
Twain or The Color Purple by Alice Walker.169 Famous nude works
by artists such as Botticelli, Manet, Matisse, Cezanne, and others
could also be included.17 ° The Act could, therefore, have a "chil-
ling effect" on speech and expression on the Internet. This
appears to be more a problem with the language of the Act
rather than a problem related to the nature of the Internet.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 179.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 180.
170. See id.
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Judge Preska also notes that the costs associated with
Internet users' attempts to comply with the terms of the Act are
excessive.' 7 1 In support of this assertion she cites ACLU v.
Reno,'7 2 which held that the costs of compliance with the Com-
munications Decency Act, along with the impending threat of
serious criminal sanctions for failure to comply, could drive some
Internet users off the Internet. 7 ' The discussion under the first
mode of analysis above shows why some owners of Web sites,
USENET groups, or listservs might find the costs too excessive
and leave certain markets all together. Those who remain in the
market would be forced to adopt some kind of system of sub-
scription or registration, so as to ensure that no potentially inde-
cent or obscene material falls into the wrong hands. This group
would include a large number of site owners who disseminate
predominantly decent material, but who would be concerned
about potential liability under the Act. In response, some indi-
vidual Internet users might conclude that the costs of subscribing
are not worth the benefit derived. This decision could force out
yet more site owners who would otherwise enjoy a significant
audience in the Act's absence. It would seem, therefore, that
"the severe burden on interstate commerce resulting from the
New York statute is not justifiable in light of the attenuated local
benefits arising from it."' 7 4 Even if one were to conclude that
the Act's local benefits are more numerous than Judge Preska
allows, the higher transaction costs that the Act imposes on the
Internet cannot be disputed. The Act clearly externalizes these
costs to Internet users outside of New York. Thus, Judge Preska's
conclusion under this mode of analysis is warranted.
c. Prohibition of State Regulation of Activities That Demand
Cohesive National Treatment
Turning to the third mode of dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, Judge Preska finds support for the proposition that "if
the mode of commerce is such that it demands consistent,
national treatment, regulation is permitted only by Congress."'175
She purports to find support for this proposition primarily in
three older cases. The first, Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway
Co. v. Illinois,176 dealt with an attempt by Illinois to establish inter-
state railway rates. The U.S. Supreme Court struck the Illinois
171. See id.
172. 929 F. Supp. 824, 855-56 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
173. See American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 180.
174. Id. at 181.
175. See Hameline & Miles, supra note 30, at 21.
176. 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
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statute at issue, stating, "this species of regulation is one which
must be, if established at all, of a general and national character,
and cannot be safely and wisely remitted to local rules and
regulations ...."1"
The second case, Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sulli-
van, 7' dealt with the constitutionality of an Arizona statute
which sought to limit the length of trains within the state to four-
teen passenger and seventy freight cars. In that case, the lower
court found that ninety-three percent of the freight traffic and
ninety-five percent of the passenger traffic in Arizona were inter-
state. 7 9 The court also found that "travel by trains of more than
fourteen passenger cars and more than seventy freight cars over
the main lines of the United States was standard practice, and
that the Arizona law had the effect of forcing railroads to
decouple their trains in Texas or New Mexico and reform the
train at full length in California.""' ° The U.S. Supreme Court
concluded that because the Arizona train limit law controlled the
length of trains beyond Arizona's borders, it imposed a serious
burden on interstate commerce. 8 1 Judge Preska observes that in
this case the Court was relying on a "long-established rule barring
the states from regulating 'those phases of the national com-
merce which, because of the need of national uniformity,
demand that their regulation, if any, be prescribed by a single
authority.' ""2
The third case, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,"s3 dealt with
an Illinois statute that required the use of contour mudguards on
trucks in Illinois. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that straight or
conventional mudguards were permitted in most states and actu-
ally required in Arkansas.1 8 4 "The Court struck the Illinois law as
imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce, in part
because Illinois was insisting upon 'a design out of line with the
requirements of almost all the other states.' "185 Although the
Court acknowledged in this case that coordinated legislation was
needed, it remains unclear whether this case belongs in the same
177. American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 181 (quoting Wabash, 118
U.S. at 577.)
178. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
179. See American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 181.
180. Id. (quoting Southern Pac., 325 U.S. at 774).
181. See id.
182. Id. (quoting Southern Pac., 325 U.S. at 767 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824))).
183. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
184. See American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 182 (citing Bibb, 359 U.S.
at 526-27).
185. Id. (citing Bibb, 359 U.S. at 528-29).
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class as Wabash and Southern Pacific. In Bibb the Court stopped
short of declaring interstate commerce via the highway system
something that should be exclusively regulated on a national
level. To that extent, it does not bolster Judge Preska's analysis
under the third mode as strongly as the other two cases.
Judge Preska analogizes these three cases to the Internet,
finding that the Internet, like the rail and highway traffic at issue
in these cases, "requires a cohesive national scheme of regulation
so that users are reasonably able to determine their obliga-
tions."'8 6 "Regulation on a local level, by contrast," she states,
"will leave users lost in a welter of inconsistent laws, imposed by
different states with different priorities."1"7 She observes that
states other than New York have enacted laws designed to protect
minors from indecent communications over the Internet, but
that the other states have adopted different methods to accom-
plish their aims." 8 She further observes that the New York Act
relies heavily on community standards in determining precisely
what sort of Internet-based communications are harmful to
minors."8 Differing community standards exist not only among
different states, but also among different communities within the
same state.'9 This results in a great deal of uncertainty and
unpredictability over what kind of material a community will find
objectionable, and which communities are likely to object.
"In this sense," she asserts, "the Internet user is in a worse
position than the truck driver or train engineer who can steer
around Illinois or Arizona, or change the mudguard or train con-
figuration at the state line; the Internet user has no ability to
bypass any particular state."' 1 Judge Preska moves from this
assertion to the conclusion that an Internet user (and by user she
means a site owner or Internet disseminator) must therefore
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id. "Georgia has made it a crime to communicate anonymously
over the Internet, while Oklahoma, like New York, has prohibited the online
transmission of material deemed harmful to minors." Id. (citing GA. CODE. ANN.
§ 16-19-93.1 (1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1040.76 (1996)).
189. See id.
190. See id. Several scholars have also argued that the local communities
Judge Preska discusses are being supplemented and gradually supplanted by
"virtual communities," or social aggregations of people who interact and
exchange ideas "long enough, and with sufficient human feeling, to form webs
of personal relationships in cyberspace." HowARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL
COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 5 (1993). For a
discussion about the challenges to state regulation posed by virtual
communities, see Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet?: Monitoring
and Supporting a New Frontier, 11 I-L v. J.L. & TECH. 429, 455-58 (1998).
191. American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 183.
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either comply with the state with the most stringent standard, or
forego the message all together. This conclusion is certainly rea-
sonable. Additionally, unlike a truck driver or train operator, a
person who disseminates material over the Internet has no idea
which routes that material will travel to reach its final destina-
tion. 192 While an Internet site owner or disseminator can restrict
subscriber access to the material he or she disseminates, and
therefore, can bypass access by resident subscribers in certain
states, the site owner/disseminator cannot restrict or control the
states through which the disseminated material travels.
But this distinction could be meaningless. Judge Preska
asserts that because site owners/disseminators would have no
idea what states through which the disseminated material trav-
eled, regulation should occur at the federal level. But because
the Internet is truly a global medium, neither will site owners/
disseminators know what country through which their dissemi-
nated material traveled. Under such logic, therefore, even fed-
eral regulation of the Internet should yield to global regulation.
Neither federal nor state regulation would be meaningful
because neither could regulate persons able to control the locali-
ties through which the information they disseminate might
travel.
But this distinction could also be meaningless in yet another
respect. Just as site owners/disseminators could not control the
locations through which their disseminated material travel,
neither could state, federal, or even international regulators
prove that the disseminated material actually traveled through
certain locations. Thus, regulation of the manner in which dis-
seminated information travels through a particular jurisdiction is
ineffective because of its inability to be enforced. There simply is
no situation on the Internet analogous to regulating truck
lengths, or mudguard use, or train lengths. The only way a state
could regulate the manner in which Internet-disseminated mate-
rial traveled through it would be to regulate the host computers
within that state. Because such computers are instrumentalities
of commerce via the Internet, however, the state would need to
overcome the Pike balancing test, an unlikely scenario.
A more meaningful theory of regulation would be regula-
tion of the disseminated material at its destination. Moreover,
under a system of advance authorization, an Internet site owner/
disseminator does have the capability to bypass certain states by
192. This point is also made by Kenneth D. Basinger in Dormant Commerce
Clause Limits on State Regulation of the Internet: The Transportation Analogy, 32 GA.
L. REv. 889, 903-14 (1998).
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simply not accepting subscriptions from those states. This would
not necessarily prove fatal to a finding that the Internet is a
mode of commerce which demands consistent, national treat-
ment. Rather, since Internet site owners/disseminators can
bypass certain states by controlling their subscription lists, the sit-
uation is more analogous to the railroad company in Arizona or
the truck driver in Illinois than Judge Preska allows.
She concludes that the Internet represents one of those
areas of commerce which should receive consistent treatment,
and thus, that it is "susceptible to regulation only on a national
level." '1 9 3 She states:
Regulation by any single state can only result in chaos,
because at least some states will likely enact laws subjecting
Internet users to conflicting obligations. Without the limi-
tations imposed by the Commerce Clause, these inconsis-
tent regulatory schemes could paralyze the development of
the Internet altogether.
Further development of the Internet requires that
users be able to predict the results of their Internet use
with some degree of assurance. Haphazard and uncoordi-
nated state regulation can only frustrate the growth of
cyberspace. The need for uniformity in this unique sphere
of commerce requires that New York's law be stricken as a
violation of the Commerce Clause.19 4
If courts adopt the final rationale offered by Judge Preska in
her third mode of analysis under the dormant Commerce
Clause, or the "need for uniformity" approach, the Internet may
enjoy freedom from virtually all state regulations.1 9 5 As Hame-
line and Miles observe, this reasoning, if followed, could preempt
most state regulation of the Internet and place the task of regula-
tion "squarely" on the federal government. 196 State consumer
protection laws, 197 tax codes, 1 98 blue-sky laws,19 9 anti-gambling
193. American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 181.
194. Id. at 181, 183.
195. Hameline and Miles make this same observation. See supra note 30,
at 21.
196. Id. at 22.
197. See supra note 103.
198. See supra note 102.
199. Hameline and Miles observe that many states are already drafting
exemptions from their regulations for generic offering notices posted on the
Internet. See supra note 30, at 23.
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provisions,200 and trademark protection measures201 applied to
the Internet could soon be challenged on dormant Commerce
Clause grounds. Due to the far-reaching ramifications this deci-
sion portends, it becomes necessary to evaluate its validity and
the extent to which it should be followed, if at all.
2. Criticism of American Libraries Association v. Pataki
As her conclusion quoted above explicitly observes, Judge
Preska assumes that the growth and further development of the
Internet is an important public policy objective. Absent this
assumption, her case for reserving the Internet for virtually
exclusive federal regulation becomes much weaker. The primary
purpose of assuring more predictability and uniformity of
Internet regulation is to encourage more commerce to take
place there. Thus, the public policy goal is an expanded Internet
on which more commercial transactions occur. The way of
attaining this goal is by ensuring uniformity and predictability of
Internet regulation. However, is this the proper role of the
judiciary?
Numerous critics think not. U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia, for example, asserts that "'negative' Commerce
Clause jurisprudence" puts the Court in a legislative role,
whereby decisions made under its guise amount to prospective
decisionmaking, and "prospective decisionmaking is incompati-
ble with the judicial role, which is to say what the law is, not to
prescribe what it shall be."20 Critics like Justice Scalia point to
the role of the judiciary envisioned by the Constitution's Fram-
ers, in which the courts were to remain free from "majoritarian"
200. Consider, for example, the law against Internet gambling recently
enacted by the state of Louisiana, which provides a maximum $500 fine or six
months in prison for an individual who participates in Internet gambling, and a
maximum $20,000 fine or five years in prison for anyone who designs, develops,
manages, supervises, maintains, provides, or produces any computer services,
computer system, computer network, computer software, or any server
providing a homepage, Web site, or any other product accessing the Internet,
World Wide Web, or any part thereof offering to any client for the primary
purpose of the conducting as a business of any game, contest, lottery, or
contrivance. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 90.3.E (West Supp. 1998). Already, more
than 600 Internet sites exist on the subject of gambling. See Salbu, supra note
190, at 443.
201. See supra note 107.
202. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 895-98
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); Petragnani, supra note 116, at 1243 (citing
American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 200-05 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)). U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clark was also a vocal-critic of the
doctrine, at one time proclaiming it a "quagmire." See Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959).
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political pressure. 2°3 The judiciary, therefore, is not the proper
body to make policy decisions. 2°4 "Weighing the governmental
interests of a State against the needs of interstate commerce is, by
contrast, a task squarely within the responsibility of Congress,...
and 'ill suited to the judicial function."' 2 5 Because the dormant
Commerce Clause must address the "inevitably shifting variables
of a national economy, ' 20 6 its critics urge that the judiciary aban-
don the doctrine completely. In addition to arguments based on
separation of powers, critics of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine also cite a lack of textual support for the doctrine in the
Constitution, a lack of support in the discernible intent of the
Framers, and an encroachment against federalism. 207
It is doubtful that, in light of the extensive body of dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence developed over nearly two cen-
turies, the Court would now invalidate the doctrine. Moreover,
the judiciary employs balancing tests similar to that used by
Judge Preska in numerous- other contexts, and these types of
tests, susceptible as they are to being riddled with policy con-
cerns, have consistently been upheld.208 Nonetheless, American
Libraries Ass'n is certainly vulnerable to the criticism that the
court has overstepped its bounds and, by enjoining the enforce-
ment of the New York Act, has made policy. Such an argument
represents ripe ground to attack the decision on appeal or to
203. Id. at 1244 (citing Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional
Federalism and Judicial Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1, 16
(1987)).
204. See id.
205. Id. (citing Bendix Autolite Corp., 486 U.S. at 897 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamic Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95
(Scalia, J., concurring))).
206. Id. (citing Smith, 496 U.S. at 203 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
207. For critiques of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, see
Petragnani, supra, note 116; Friedman, supra note 116; Redish & Nugent, supra
note 116. Critics have also asserted that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
in Article IV will accomplish alone what the courts have attempted to
accomplish through their use of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See
Redish & Nugent, supra note 116, at 605-12. See also Richard A. Epstein, The
Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1410 (1987).
208. Consider, for example, the Lemon test, used widely in Supreme
Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971). The test, though weakened, has been upheld. As another example
of a balancing test, consider the test adopted in substantive due process
jurisprudence with respect to abortion, balancing the woman's fight to privacy
in making a decision about whether to terminate her pregnancy against the
State's fight to protect the potential life she carries as long as the State does not
impose an "undue burden" on the woman's privacy fights. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994).
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attack a future attempt to invalidate state regulation of the
Internet under the auspices of the dormant Commerce Clause.
Dormant Commerce Clause critics certainly might construe
congressional silence as a willingness by federal legislators to
allow the states to regulate the Internet. However, congressional
silence could also be construed in another sense. If the premise
that the Internet-based activity comprises interstate commerce
remains undisputed, then Congress has authority to act in this
area, though it might opt not to act. By not acting, Congress has
not placed any obstacles, at least at the federal level, in front of
the unfettered growth of the Internet. In this sense, the congres-
sional decision not to act could be the best evidence of a national
public policy to leave the Internet alone and let it grow. Since
inconsistent state regulations unduly interfere with that "unwrit-
ten" policy, they present obstacles to the Internet's continued
growth and development. Seen in this light, Judge Preska's opin-
ion adopts the only alternative: virtually exclusive federal juris-
diction over the Internet.
This argument, while seemingly tenuous, is no different
from the argument advocated by critics of the dormant Com-
merce Clause. Both advocates and opponents of dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence advance their own meanings of
congressional silence. Opponents view congressional silence as
deference to state legislation. Proponents of the dormant Com-
merce Clause, by contrast, view congressional silence not as def-
erence to state legislation, but simply as the lack of a
congressional will to act. The absence of a will to act does not
mean that courts are prevented from finding a given transaction
or series of transactions to be interstate commerce.209 Similarly,
the fact that Congress has acted does not suddenly transform
intrastate commerce into interstate commerce. Courts have
invalidated congressional overreaching into the sovereign affairs
of states just as readily as they have invalidated state overreaching
detrimental to interstate commerce. 210 But Congress can reverse
209. Proponents of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence advance
numerous other arguments in support of the doctrine. The "implicit"
structural argument maintains that while no explicit textual authorization may
exist for the dormant Commerce Clause concept, the principle is implicit
within the constitutional structure, and therefore valid. See Regan, supra note
116. Other arguments advance a concept of "constitutional common law." See
Henry Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreward: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1(1975). For a good summary of these positions,
see Redish & Nugent, supra, note 116.
210. See, e.g., Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (holding that the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeds Congress' power because it would
amount to a "considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional
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the effects ofjudicial invalidation of state overreaching by legisla-
tively carving out certain areas for state regulation, even though
an existing federal legislative scheme might otherwise preempt
state action in that particular area.211
It lies beyond the scope of this Note to evaluate and/or jus-
tify the merits of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Rather, the foregoing is offered to illustrate the divisions among
legal scholars and jurists about the legitimacy of this theory.
Although dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has arguably
been employed by the courts since Gibbons v. Ogden,212 the theory
remains murky and widely disputed. These divisions raise the
possibility, however unlikely, that Judge Preska's opinion could
be reversed, modified, or vacated on appeal by a court hostile to
the doctrine. Even if the validity of the doctrine remains intact
on appeal in this case or in future cases employing the doctrine
to invalidate state regulation of Internet-based activities, American
Libraries Ass'n and its future progeny raise other problems.
As shown above, Judge Preska's analysis fails to necessarily
prove that the New York Act is "per se" violative of the commerce
clause. Moreover, her analysis under the third mode-that the
Internet is a mode of commerce that demands consistent
national treatment-could be vulnerable because of her misstate-
ments about an Internet owner's capability to avoid certain
states. As previously shown, a system of registration and advance
notification would allow Internet users to restrict subscriptions to
residents from certain states. This weakens her premise that the
Internet, by its nature, is susceptible to regulation almost exclu-
prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of
their citizens."); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding
that a provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act requiring states
to accept ownership of waste or regulate according to instructions of Congress,
lies outside Congress' enumerated powers and violates the Tenth Amendment);
Frank v. United States, 129 F.3d 273 (1997) (on remand from the United States
Supreme Court, 117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997)) (holding that the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act violated the Tenth Amendment to the extent that it
required local law enforcement officers to undertake background checks of
potential handgun buyers and related form transmittals); Acorn v. Edwards, 81
F.3d 1387 (1996) (holding that the provision of the Lead Contamination
Control Act requiring states to establish remedial action programs for removal
of lead contaminants from school and day-care drinking water systems violates
the Tenth Amendment).
211. For example, in § 501 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 161 (1980)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a), Congress allowed a state
legislature to reassert the state's usury provision preempted by the act, thereby
overriding the federal legislation.
212. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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sively at the federal level. This weakness could lead a court to
invalidate Judge Preska's conclusion in her first and third modes
of analysis. This would leave intact only the second mode, the
"undue burdens" approach, which envisions concurrent regulation
of the Internet both by states and by Congress.2 1 3
C. The State Interests in Regulating the Internet
This possibility leads us to inquire about how such concur-
rent regulation would work. Is concurrent regulation of the
Internet even possible? We begin with an assessment of what the
legitimate regulatory interests of states are, and move from there
into those areas less likely to find insulation from dormant Com-
merce Clause scrutiny.
Analysis under the dormant Commerce Clause applies only
to those state regulations found to be discriminatory. According
to Michael E. Smith,2 14 a regulation is discriminatory if "it
imposes greater economic burdens on those outside the state to
the economic advantage of those within." '2 15 Smith notes the two
main issues a court must reconcile when applying this definition
to a state regulation and also notes who must bear the burden of
showing that the regulation is discriminatory:
The proposed definition of discrimination gives rise to two
main issues: what kinds of economic burdens are sufficient
to constitute a disfavored discrimination, and what is a suf-
ficiently unequal distribution of burdens and advantages.
On the two issues, as on all others that concern whether
the regulation is discriminatory, the party challenging the
regulation, not the state, has the burden of proof.2 1
6
The first issue addresses the kinds of economic burdens suf-
ficient to constitute a disfavored discrimination. Regulations
that obstruct the flow of goods originating from outside the regu-
213. In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), the U.S.
Supreme Court enunciated the principle that the federal jurisdiction under the
Commerce Clause comes in two parts. For matters such as pilotage in local
waters that fall within interstate commerce but that are also of significant local
concern, the federal and state jurisdictions are concurrent. See 53 U.S. (12
How.) at 319-20. For those matters for which there should be a uniform rule,
the power of Congress is exclusive. See id. at 319.
214. Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley.
215. Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74
CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1213 (1986). Smith intends this definition to combine the
phrasing used by Justices Cardozo and Stone derived from two leading U.S.
Supreme Court cases: Baldwin v. G.AF. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935)
(CardozoJ., for the majority), and South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros.,
303 U.S. 177 (1938) (Stone, J., for the majority).
216. Id.
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lating state are generally found to be sufficient in this regard. y
Similarly, regulations that artificially inflate the price of goods
originating outside the regulating state are generally also suffi-
cient.2 s As with restrictions on the flow of incoming goods, reg-
ulations that restrict the flow of outgoing goods are generally
also found to be a burden sufficient enough to comprise a disfa-
vored discrimination. 1 However, in some cases, the Court has
upheld regulations that increase the prices that out-of-state buy-
ers pay for goods made in-state.22 °
Turning to the second issue, at what point are a regulation's
burdens and advantages sufficiently unequal? According to
Smith, it is not possible to specify how uneven the distribution of
burdens and advantages must be to count as a discrimination. 221
Smith does make a few generalizations, however. While the
Commerce Clause has traditionally been concerned with the
shifting of economic benefits and burdens, some U.S. Supreme
Court decisions "suggest that the shifting of noneconomic bur-
dens to people elsewhere may also constitute discrimination. 222
Noneconomic burdens include things like shifting health and
safety hazards to other states.225 Examples might include regula-
tions that divert the transportation of hazardous cargo to other
states, or regulations that inhibit the incoming flow of toxic waste
for disposal from sources outside the state.
Potential discrimination might also consist of granting
undue benefits, such as state money or resources, to local people.
Since 1976, however, the Supreme Court has held that these ben-
efits are entirely outside the Commerce Clause altogether. In so
doing, the Court has distinguished state regulation of the private
market, which is subject to the Commerce Clause, from state par-
ticipation in the market, which is not.224 The latter has come to
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 1214 (citing H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525
(1949); Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346 (1939)).
221. See id. at 1219.
222. Id. at 1220 (citing Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S.
662 (1981); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)).
223. Smith notes that the use of the Commerce Clause in this area may
go beyond the Framers' intent, as they were concerned primarily with state
actions involving the imposition of economic burdens. Moreover, the Court
associates state independence mainly with noneconomic interests such as
health and safety rather than regulation. See id. at 1222.
224. See id. (citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980);
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808-09 (1976)).
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be known as the "market-participant exception" to the dormant
Commerce Clause.225
In employing this exception, the Court has held that no vio-
lation of the Commerce Clause occurs when states prefer resi-
dents over nonresidents in hiring workers, selling goods, or
purchasing services for government use.226 The market partici-
pant exception relies on a distinction between impermissible reg-
ulation and permissible participation.2 2 7 Commentators have
criticized this distinction because of its vagueness and also
because of the little guidance it gives lower courts.2 28 Indeed,
the Court has not articulated criteria which lower courts could
use to distinguish regulation from participation.229 Other com-
mentators have defended the market-participant doctrine.23 °
These commentators offer four principal justifications for the
doctrine: (1) it is "fair and consistent with broadly shared con-
ceptions of property to let state governments favor state residents
when selecting the recipients of the state's own largess; '23 1 (2)
the values of federalism weigh heavily against interference with
state autonomy in this area;23 2 (3) "marketplace preferences for
local concerns in general pose less of a danger to [C]ommerce
[C]lause values than do those discriminatory regulations and
taxes that engendered recognition of the dormant [C]ommerce
[C]lause principle; '233 and (4) considerations emanating from
the constitutional text and its history suggest that states should
have more latitude when dealing in the market than when regu-
lating the efforts of others at free trade. 23 '4 The disagreements
among legal scholars about the market-participant exception's
225. For good discussions of the market participant exceptions to the
dormant Commerce Clause, see generally Barton B. Clark, Comment, Give 'Em
Enough Rope: States, Subdivisions and the Market Participant Exception to the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 615 (1993); Dan T. Coenen, State UserFees
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 50 VAND. L. REv. 795 (1997); Dan T. Coenen,
supra note 114.
226. See Coenen, supra note 225, at 799 (citing White v. Massachusetts
Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980); American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp.
719, 725 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (three-judge panel), affd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972)).
227. See Clark, supra note 225, at 620.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 114, at 398 ("The Court's market-
participant decisions reflect a sound, if complex, accommodation of competing
constitutional values.").
231. Id. at 420
232. See id.
233. Id.
234. See id.
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efficacy as a workable legal doctrine illustrate perhaps its short-
comings and shed a questionable light on its future.
Applying the foregoing discussion to state regulation of the
Internet, other state regulations similar to the New York Act
could potentially be construed as discriminatory on the grounds
that they obstruct the flow of goods originating from outside the
regulating state. This requires that "goods" be defined as images,
information, documents, music, videos, pictures, or other media
transmitted or downloaded via the Internet. Given the broad
definition of commerce that modern courts currently apply, an
expansive definition of "goods" that includes media transmitted
over the Internet does not seem inconsistent with current dor-
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The New York Act does
indeed obstruct the flow of these types of goods originating from
outside New York because it requires that disseminators of mate-
rial which could potentially come within its terms take further
measures to comply with the Act.
It could be more difficult for state regulations similar to the
New York Act to be construed as discriminatory on the grounds
that they artificially inflate the price of goods originating outside
the regulating state. Compliance with the New York Act would
artificially inflate the costs of Internet site owners outside the
state who disseminate material coming within its terms. But the
cost of compliance for those outside the state of New York would
be equal to that of those inside the state. The Act artificially
inflates the price of goods, but does so in a manner that does not
discriminate between New York residents and non-residents. Site
owners inside New York that disseminate material coming within
the Act's terms will absorb the same increase in costs as those
outside the state.
State regulations that strive to tax in-state subscriptions only
to out-of-state Internet dissemination services would be con-
strued as discriminatory because they would impose a cost on
out-of-state Internet disseminators that those in-state would not
have. Such regulations would obstruct the flow of goods by artifi-
cially increasing the costs of subscriptions to Internet dissemina-
tors outside the state. The increased costs that the tax would
impose could cause several consumers within the state, who
would otherwise subscribe, to opt against subscribing. This
would lower the overall number of subscribers the out-of-state
disseminator could otherwise obtain in the absence of the tax.
The lower number of subscribers, in turn, represents an indirect
way that an out-of-state disseminator of material on the Internet
would have his or her own costs artificially inflated by a state tax
regulation.
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A state regulation that strives to tax in-state Internet dissemi-
nators could be construed as discriminatory on the grounds that
such a measure would restrict the flow of outgoing goods. It
would do this by artificially increasing the cost of disseminating
material to all subscribers, both in-state and out-of-state. These
increased costs would be passed along to subscribers through an
inflated subscription price, thereby making the disseminators less
competitive with other out-of-state disseminators who do not
need to pay such taxes in their states. The result would be fewer
subscribers to services provided by in-state Internet dissemina-
tors, both inside and outside the state. This, in turn, would cause
a decrease in the amount of goods the taxed in-state Internet
entities disseminate in general.
As a market participant, a state could get away with more. A
state government may decide to select and pay a private contrac-
tor to disseminate (or post on the Web) all of its various govern-
ment documents. As a market participant, a state government
could confer this benefit entirely on one Internet disseminator
within the state. Similarly, a state could become an ISP itself,
competing in the market with other service providers, charging
user fees to those who use the state's Internet services.23 5 As an
ISP, it could charge lower user fees to state residents than to out-
of-state residents, just as could a private ISP. A state government
may also become a consumer of various Internet services, opting
to utilize one or several in-state ISPs over others.
If a state regulation is found to be discriminatory, the state
has the burden ofjustifying it. This burden consists of three sep-
arate showings that states must make. According to Michael
Smith:
First, the state must prove that it has a legitimate interest to
be served by the regulation. Second, it must show that the
regulation serves this interest to a substantial extent.
Third, it must prove that it has no available alternatives to
the regulation that are less discriminatory. Uncertainty on
the record on these points, particularly the latter two, is
resolved against the state. The state is excused from its
burden of proof only if Congress has consented to the dis-
crimination, which rarely occurs.2 3 6
235. The state, under such a scenario, would need to employ the same
measures as a private ISP to identify those who use the state's service (e.g., a
subscription system) so that the user fees the state charges are not paid by users
who do not use its services. Otherwise, the state would expose itself to antitrust
claims.
236. Smith, supra note 215, at 1231 (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 336 (1979)). See generally Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349,
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Since a state must sufficiently make each of these showings,
this burden is a very heavy one. Recent U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence suggests that the Court is in no way reluctant to
invalidate a state regulation for its failure to meet any one of the
three conditions mentioned above. State attempts tojustify regu-
lations have been rejected by the Court on the ground that
either the asserted state interests were illegitimate, that they were
not substantially served by regulation, that less discriminatory
alternative means were available, or some combination
thereof.2
3 7
In cases involving discriminatory state regulations, the
Supreme Court has found a variety of noneconomic state inter-
ests to be legitimate. Most frequently cited are traditional police
power concerns, health, and safety. 238 In application, these have
interests that have ranged from highway and employee safety to
healthful milk, air, and water.23 9 Over the years the Court has
recognized the legitimacy of other noneconomic interests as
well. These include racial equality, household privacy, and the
protection of natural resources. 24 The Court has recognized
even some economic interests as being legitimate. "States may
protect consumers from conventionally disfavored economic dis-
advantages such as fraud and overreaching, confusion, and
incompetent or inadequately insured sellers." 2 41 States may also
354 (1951) (discussing the showings that states must make); Hunt v.
Washington Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (discussing the
same issue).
237. See Smith, supra note 215, at 1232.
238. Smith notes that occasionally the Court has suggested that health
and safety are weightier than other legitimate state interests and thus might
more readily justify a discriminatory regulation. See id. at 1234.
239. See id. at 1232-33 (citing Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434
U.S. 429, 443 (1978); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 523 (1959);
Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1 (1943); South
Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187-90 (1938) as
examples of highway and employee safety cases; also citing Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982); Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960); Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 353).
240. Id. at 1233 (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456, 471 (1981) (involving protection of natural resources); Huges v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (involving same issue); Breard v. City of
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 640 (1951) (concerning household privacy); Bob-Lo
Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 40 (1948) (focussing on racial
equality)).
241. Id. (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982);
Washington Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. at 353; Robertson v. California, 328
U.S. 440, 457 (1946); California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1941)).
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protect consumers from high prices2 4 2 as well as excessive gov-
ernment costs.
2 4 3
In analyzing whether a regulation serves the asserted state
interest to a substantial enough extent, "[u] nless the legislature
is peculiarly inept, state regulations ought to satisfy this test fairly
readily. '24 4 In analyzing whether there exist less discriminatory
alternatives to a state regulation, the Court has begun to insist
that there be a "close fit" between the geographical scope of the
regulation and the need that allegedly justifies it.245 In other
words, the regulation may be neither unduly underinclusive in
burdening local residents nor unduly overinclusive in relation to
people elsewhere. If the former, the regulation may not serve
the state's asserted interest to a substantial enough extent, and
the state presumably has the less discriminatory alternative of
expanding the scope of the regulation. If the latter, the state can
presumably narrow the regulation's scope without also sacrificing
the asserted interest.246
Applying the above discussion to state regulation of the
Internet, what type of state interests regarding Internet-based
activities would a federal court likely regard as legitimate? It
would seem that regulations banning Internet-based fraud,
though discriminatory, would come within the police power
exception to the dormant Commerce Clause. The Court would
likely give states some latitude and flexibility in this area, since
such state measures are designed to protect consumers. Simi-
larly, regulations banning anonymity would seem to be well
within this purview. State regulations imposing criminal liability
for transmitting computer viruses into the state could be justified
as measures designed to promote health and safety-the health
and safety not only of the Internet, but of all the computer sys-
tems linked to the Internet.
There are other state interests which a federal court would
likely regard as invalid. Recently enacted legislation in some
states banning wine sales over the Internet would seem to impli-
cate concerns about discrimination against out-of-state com-
242. See id. (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626
(1978); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 341 U.S.
329, 334 (1951)).
243. See id. (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627
(1978); Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 355; Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 187, 196).
244. Id. at 1236.
245. Id. at 1238.
246. See id.
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merce.247 Additionally, while a state has an interest in protecting
its residents from high prices, an attempt by a state to regulate
prices on the Internet might fail to prove the least discriminatory
way of protecting consumers from high prices, especially given
the difficulties associated with defining the applicable market
involved, the applicable competitors of the ISPs or disseminators
affected, and the applicable market price. The very nature of the
Internet makes discovering the answers to these questions virtu-
ally impossible.
Similarly, although the state could likely justify a measure
banning Internet anonymity, it might have more difficulty justify-
ing a particular encryption or registration scheme because of the
consequences such a scheme would have to ISPs and dissemina-
tors outside the state. Such a specific scheme would, likely be
stricken because it would fail to prove the least discriminatory
way of protecting against fraud, especially in light of a less dis-
criminatory alternative-a simple ban on anonymous transmis-
sion. Any scheme more specific would too readily resemble
measures requiring specific types of mudflaps on trucks, 248 spe-
cific train lengths,249 or specific identification criteria for apple
crates.
250
State regulation of Internet-based gambling presents a less
clear-cut case. 2 5 1 Although states have traditionally regulated the
gambling that has occurred within their borders, the global and
trans-jurisdictional nature of the Internet makes state regulation
of Internet gambling more tenuous.25 2 Such regulation would
undoubtedly be discriminatory. However, a state's ability to resist
a dormant Commerce Clause challenge would depend on that
247. The states of Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and North
Carolina have enacted laws making it a felony to ship alcoholic beverages to
residents of their states. Concerns about underage drinking and lost tax
revenues seem to be the driving force behind these enactments. Vinters claim
that the real reason for the enactments is to protect the oligopoly of liquor
distributors in those states. See Electronic Commerce Update, supra note 48. It is
unclear whether these provisions would withstand a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge.
248. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
249. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
250. See Hunt v. Washington Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977).
251. For an evaluation of Louisiana's recently enacted provision against
Internet gambling (LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:90.3.E (West Supp. 1998)) with
respect to the dormant Commerce Clause, see Bassinger, supra note 192, at 915-
22.
252. Traditionally, such state regulations have been justified under the
guise of states' police power, "likely motivated by an interest in protecting the
state-run gambling monopolies." Hameline & Miles, supra note 30, at 22.
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state's ability to effectively assert a vital state interest in the regu-
lation. The burdens associated with gambling include addiction,
diminished job performance, crime, decreased spending on
other forms of entertainment, and the regressive nature of gam-
bling.25 This would suggest that a state could justify a discrimi-
natory regulation affecting Internet gambling on the grounds
that, although it might obstruct the flow of goods, it promotes
the health and safety of state residents.254  While such
noneconomic interests would likely be upheld, a state would
encounter great difficulty asserting that any measure which
restricts or heavily regulates Internet gambling is the least dis-
criminatory alternative, especially in light of the fact that several
states, such as Nevada, permit widespread gambling.
Clearly, concurrent regulation of the Internet by both fed-
eral and state authorities may be perhaps the most equitable
means of fairly balancing state and federal interests. It would not
come without a price, however. Legal uncertainty and unpredict-
ability would still continue. While the dormant Commerce
Clause will forestall some state regulatory measures, other care-
fully crafted measures in a limited number of areas will escape
invalidation and survive to shape the future of the Internet. In
other areas, the more murky ones, the dormant Commerce
Clause will invite further litigation to better define lines of
demarcation between legitimate state interests in regulating the
Internet and those areas which, because of their strong linkage
with interstate commerce, are susceptible only to federal
regulation.
V. CONCLUSION
We can arrive at several conclusions concerning the impact
the dormant Commerce Clause might have on state regulation of
the Internet. First, dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
has its share of critics. Although unlikely, the doctrine could be
completely scrapped or at least modified by the U.S. Supreme
Court. This would clear the way for states to aggressively regulate
the Internet in those areas where Congress has not. It would also
mean less predictability from state to state of liability for individu-
als engaging in commerce over the Internet. Second, although
rare in practice, Congress could carve out specific areas for state
regulation of the Internet. For example, Congress could allow
states to impose registration requirements on ISPs. Third, states
253. See Montpas, supra note 105, at 170-71.
254. For a more detailed discussion of the localized interests states might
have in regulating Internet gambling, see Salbu, supra note 190, at 443-48.
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could have a direct role in shaping the future of the Internet by
becoming market participants rather than regulators. For exam-
ple, a state could become an ISP in competition with other ISPs.
Fourth, states could use noneconomic interests such as their
police powers, health, safety, and consumer protection from
fraud and overreaching to have a direct impact on the develop-
ment of the Internet. Fifth, while the lines of demarcation seem
clear when it comes to state prevention of fraud, anonymity, or
prohibition of computer viruses, there exist several other cases,
such as state regulation of Internet gambling, which are less
clear-cut. These more murky cases will demand resolution either
through the courts or through congressional preemption.
I conclude that the result in American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki
should be followed. Despite the strong arguments, set forth
above, militating heavily against Judge Preska's first mode analy-
sis, the "per se" approach, and third mode analysis, the "need for
uniformity" approach, her second mode analysis, the "undue
burdens" approach, seems unassailable. The New York Act does,
indeed, impose burdens on the residents of other states which
far exceed the limited benefits New York residents could derive
from the Act. Even if only this second mode of analysis were to
survive an attack on appeal, it introduces dormant Commerce
Clause considerations to state regulation of the Internet. These
considerations cannot be ignored. The Internet, by its nature, is
a conduit of interstate commerce. Construing the Internet as a
conduit of interstate commerce will not put all issues to rest, but
it will certainly narrow the issues.
By forestalling some state regulatory measures, the dormant
Commerce Clause will take the Internet's development down a
new path. But this path has its own share of problems. How
broad will the market-participant exception be when applied to
state regulation of the Internet? How far can a state go in man-
dating a system of registration in the name of preventing fraud?
Without congressional action, these questions will be resolved
judicially through expensive and protracted litigation. Such liti-
gation would only impede the more rapid growth and develop-
ment of the Internet. Thus, if the growth and further
development of the Internet as a commercial mechanism
remains an important public policy goal, then Congress should
act to make Internet liability more predictable and more stable.
American Libraries Ass'n has paved the way for Congress to
act. The measures such as the Internet Tax Freedom Act
recently enacted by the 105th Congress represent important first
steps, but they are baby steps. The Internet Tax Freedom Act
itself merely imposes a moratorium on federal, state, or local tax-
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ation of Internet access so that regulators can study the Internet
and the potential effects that various proposed federal or state
taxation schemes might have on electronic commerce. The
states presumably retain the power to tax areas other than
Internet access, and to regulate other Internet-based activities
under their police powers. Because lines of dermaarcation
between permissible and impermissible state and local regulation
of these activities have yet to be drawn, the Internet continues to
remain an uncertain environment for commercial transactions.
This is why additional congressional preemption would be help-
ful. Clearly, it would hardly settle the debate about how to regu-
late the Internet, but it would make that debate more
manageable by making it a national debate. It would focus the
attention and energy of the many commercial interests that the
Internet serves. This step alone would confer a great deal more
stability and predictability upon Internet commerce than would
the current regime, with its fifty-one separate jurisdictions apply-
ing disparate and inconsistent regulatory paradigms to the
Internet.
I have not made a case in this paper for the specific type of
legal and regulatory paradigm Congress should enact. Such
questions do not lend themselves to easy answers, nor should
they. Indeed, Congress must be careful not to arrest the rapid
development of this new technological medium. Additionally,
the formulation of a comprehensive regulatory paradigm for a
technological medium in the midst of evolution will be a formi-
dable task to complete, even in eighteen months. On the other
hand, the absence of national uniformity in this area might be
precisely what impedes a pace of development perhaps even
more robust-and also more logical and consistent-than what
we have seen. By exercising its jurisdiction over this instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce, Congress would confer more than
stability. It would also confer legitimacy. This legitimacy would
encourage many more commercial interests to take their wide
variety of endeavors to the Internet with confidence. I believe,
therefore, that proper congressional regulation of Internet com-
merce is not necessarily coterminous with the reduction or
demise of that commerce. To the contrary, carefully crafted and
prudently calculated legislation might permit Internet-based
commerce to blossom even more than it already has.
Additionally, as American Libraries Ass'n shows us, the federal
courts are willing to act where Congress has not. Furthermore,
given the trends I have highlighted in this note, federal litigation
over Internet-based activities is likely to increase, not decline.
Thus, Congress must decide whether these issues should play out
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in ajudicial arena or in a legislative one. I believe that Congress,
rather than the courts, is a more appropriate forum for defining
lines of demarcation between legitimate state interests in regulat-
ing the Internet and those areas which should-and do-reside
within the purview of federal regulatory power. Unlike a court,
Congress is a deliberative body, able to carefully consider many
interests that could never find adequate representation in a
pending suit. Moreover, Congress has the ability-through legis-
lation-to craft remedies that a court could never fashion.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Congress can revise,
reform, and even repeal ineffective legislation. Judicial deci-
sions, by contrast, are much more difficult to overturn. The
court in American Libraries Ass'n appears to have reached the cor-
rect result. But this hardly guarantees that courts in future cases
will do the same. For these reasons, congressional regulation of
Internet commerce is both appropriate and timely.
